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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we develop a framework for analyzing airlines' operational performances
under different strategic decisions. A detailed study is conducted to compare
differences between a major U.S. legacy carrier and a major U.S. low-cost carrier in
terms of their scheduling practices, flight-based delays and on-time performances,
network operations and mix of passengers, as well as passenger delays and disruptions.
One major contribution of this thesis is that the framework we develop to evaluate
airlines' performances is not restricted by the availability of proprietary airline data and
can be adopted to estimate itinerary-based passenger demand for any U.S. airline
included in the Bureau of Transportation Statistics database. Moreover, in this thesis,
we compute delay for local and connecting passengers and provide a powerful tool for
scenario analysis. Further, we: (1) identify root causes of delays as well as the impact
throughout the network; (2) gain insights about how passenger delay can be reduced
with different scheduling practices; and (3) guide the design of on-time performance
metrics.
Differences in scheduling practices, network operations, passenger mix, aircraft delays,
and passenger delays between different airlines arise from carrier-specific
characteristics. These characteristics should be considered when designing on-time
performance metrics. Characteristics specific to the legacy carrier are: (1) its hubs
experience heavy traffic volume and are often subject to ground delay programs (GDPs)
caused by poor weather conditions; and (2) it operates banked hubs where a set of
arriving flight legs are scheduled closely with a set of departing flight legs to allow
passenger connections between arriving and departing flight legs. Characteristics
specific to the low-cost carrier are: (1) it tends to fly into locations that are less impacted
by weather conditions and less frequently subjected to GDPs; (2) passenger traffic is
distributed more evenly in the system, unlike the case of the legacy carrier in which a
much larger portion of passengers connect through the major hubs; and (3) it has de-
peaked schedules at the major airports which allow the carrier to achieve higher
efficiency in turning aircraft. Another important distinction between the two airlines
that needs to be considered when designing on-time performance metrics is: the ratio of
passenger delay (especially disrupted passenger delay) to operated flight delay for the
low-cost carrier was higher than the corresponding value for the legacy carrier. This
difference indicates that flight-specific on-time performance metrics that ignore airline
heterogeneity can be an inaccurate measure of passenger experiences.
In this thesis, scenario representations pertaining to various levels of airport traffic
under different weather conditions are analyzed within our framework. We measure
passenger delays (that is, the positive difference between the actual arrival time of the
passenger at his/her destination and the scheduled arrival time) and passenger
disruptions, with a passenger disruption defined as a passenger who is re-booked on an
itinerary other than that planned due to a missed connection or flight cancellation. Our
results show that for the legacy carrier, an increase in flight operations of one percent on
the "high-delay" day translates to an increase in the percentage of disrupted passengers
(average disrupted passenger delay) of 22.2% (3.1%); for the low-cost carrier, an
increase in flight operations of one percent only increases the percentage of disrupted
passengers (average disrupted passenger delay) by 12.3% (2.7%). The above statistics
suggest that under poor weather conditions, increasing flight operations at busy
airports, compared to non-congested airports, can cause a much greater increase in
passenger delay and disruptions when airport capacity is reduced by adverse weather
condition.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Owing to the growing economy of the 1990's, airlines increased service and sometimes
scheduled more flights than busy airports could handle, even in optimal weather
conditions. According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), from 1990 to
2006, the number of flights operated by commercial airlines in the United States grew
from 6.6 million in 1989 to 8.0 million in 2006, a 21% increase. In that same period,
airport capacity is increased by only 1%. As more and more flights were scheduled at
congested airports, ground congestion became a major hindrance to efficient operations.
One indicator is that aircraft taxi-out times at major US airports increased sharply: the
number of flights with taxi-out times exceeding one hour increased by 165% from 1995
to 2000, from 17,331 flights in 1995 to 45,993 flights in 2000 (Mead (2001) [22]).
Furthermore, the unbalanced increase in flight operations relative to total airport
capacity caused severe system congestion, and numerous flight delays as well as
cancellations, adversely affecting the traveling public.
1.1 Operations Service Reliability and Customer Satisfaction
Although flight schedules and ticket prices have proven to be the main drivers of airline
profitability (Gopalan and Talluri (1998) [16]), studies show that customer satisfaction
and loyalty drive long-term profitability (Heskett et al. (1994) [18]). Because the airline
industry is a highly competitive business, high service reliability can be a major
advantage to attract and retain passengers. In particular, business passengers who tend
to be more time sensitive (Belobaba and Simpson (1982) [2]) are especially valuable to
airline profitability. Similarly, low service reliability can result in decreasing average
fares (Janusewski (2002) [19]).
To provide consumers information on the quality of services provided by the airlines,
the current Department of Transportation (DOT) Air Travel Consumer Report uses six
types of information to evaluate airline service reliability: (1) flight delays, (2)
mishandled baggage, (3) oversales, (4) consumer complaints, (5) incidents involving the
loss or injury of animals during air transportation, and (6) customer service reports. (1),
(2), and (3) are reported by the BTS; (4) and (5) are reported by the DOT Aviation
Consumer Protection Division based on complaints submitted by customers; and (6) is
generated from information submitted to the Transportation Security Administration
related to airline and airport security. As illustrated in Figure 1-1 (Air Travel Consumer
Report (2006) [13]), the most common complaints are related to flight problems, defined
as "flight cancellations, delays, or any other deviations from schedule, whether planned
or unplanned" by the DOT.
Oversales 4.0%
Fares 1.6%
Figure 1-1: Distribution of passenger complaints in July, 2006
1.2 Flight Delay and On-Time Performance Measurement in the U.S.
Since 1987, flight delay statistics have been published in the Air Travel Consumer
Report on a monthly basis and maintained in the Airline Service Quality Performance
(ASQP) database, which is publicly accessible. The major airlines in the U.S. (defined as
airlines generating revenues of $1 billion or more annually) are mandated by federal
law to provide flight operation information, including actual departure time, arrival
time, cancellation and diversion, for each domestic U.S. flight serviced by jet aircraft. In
2006, 18 U.S. carriers met this requirement.
The metric currently employed by the DOT and airlines to estimate on-time
performance is the 15 minutes on-time performance (15-OTP), also referred to as the airline
dependability statistic. According to this metric, a flight is considered to be on time if it
arrives within 15 minutes or earlier of its scheduled arrival time and a canceled flight is
classified as a delayed flight. Based on the Air Travel Consumer Report for May 2008
[13], the industry achieved an average 79.0% on-time arrival rate for all airports
reported. Hawaiian Airlines reported the best performance with 88.9% on-time arrivals,
while American Airlines reported the worst performance with 67.3% on-time arrivals.
In terms of airports, Newark, NJ (EWR) experienced the worst on-time arrival
performance of 63.16% and Salt Lake City (SLC) achieved the best performance of
88.66%. Table 1-1 lists the percentage of flight operations arriving on time by carrier.
Table 1-2 displays the ranking of major airports' on-time arrival performance. For more
details on on-time performance, see http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/index.htm.
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES
PINNACLE AIRLINES 114 85.9
AIRTRAN AIRWAYS 57 84.7
SKYWEST AIRLINES 143 84.5
DELTA AIR LINES 91 84.1
ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES 124 83.8
US AIRWAYS 82 83.6
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES 64 80.9
ALASKA AIRLINES 45 80.4
JETBLUE AIRWAYS 46 79.2
NORTHWEST AIRLINES 96 78.9
COMAIR 87 78.4
MESA AIRLINE 116 76.9
FRONTIER AIRLINES 45 76.5
AMERICAN EAGLE 114 76.3
EXPRESSJET AIRLINES 126 76.1
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES 63 75.4
UNITED AIRLINES 81 72.4
AMERICAN AIRLINES 67.3
Table 1-1: Percentage of flight operations arriving on time by carrier in May 2008
Source: Air Travel Consumer Report
88.9
Rank May 2008 %
1 Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 88.66
2 Baltimore, MD (BWI) 86.65
3 Chicago, IL (MDW) 84.95
4 Orlando, FL (MCO) 84.67
5 Cincinnati, OH (CVG) 84.65
6 Atlanta, GA (ATL) 84.32
7 Tampa, FL (TPA) 84.28
8 Detroit, MI (DTW) 83.99
9 Charlotte, NC (CLT) 83.48
10 Washington, DC (DCA) 82.29
11 Fort Lauderdale, FL (FLL) 81.53
12 Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN (MSP) 81.50
13 Washington, DC (IAD) 79.79
14 Boston, MA (BOS) 79.78
15 Houston, TX (IAH) 79.74
16 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 79.60
17 Oakland, CA (OAK) 78.96
18 Portland, OR (PDX) 78.50
19 St. Louis, MO (STL) 78.01
20 New York, NY (JFK) 77.27
21 Seattle, WA (SEA) 77.20
22 Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 76.01
23 Denver, CO (DEN) 75.92
24 San Diego, CA (SAN) 75.45
25 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 75.15
26 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 75.09
27 Miami, FL (MIA) 74.75
28 Chicago, IL (ORD) 74.07
29 San Francisco, CA (SFO) 71.65
30 Dallas/Ft.Worth, TX (DFW) 70.91
31 New York, NY (LGA) 64.11
32 Newark, NJ (EWR) 63.16
(Percent On-Time)
Table 1-2: Ranking of major airport on-time arrival performance in May 2008
Source: BTS, Airline On-Time Data
1.3 Causes of Flight Delays
The DOT divides the causes of flight delays into five categories1:
* Air Carrier Delay: The cause of the cancellation or delay was due to circumstances
within the airline's control (e.g. maintenance or crew problems, etc.).
* Extreme Weather Delay: Significant meteorological conditions (actual or forecasted)
that, in the judgment of the carrier, delays or prevents the operation of a flight.
* National Aviation System Delay: Delays and cancellations attributable to the
national aviation system (NAS) refer to a broad set of conditions -- non-extreme
weather conditions, airport operations, heavy traffic volume, air traffic control, etc.
* Security Delay: Delays caused by evacuation of terminal or concourse, re-boarding
of aircraft because of security breech, inoperative screening equipment and long
lines in excess of 29 minutes at screening areas.
* Late Arriving Aircraft Delay: The previous flight with same aircraft arrived late
which caused the present flight to depart late.
By definition of the DOT, a "cancelled" flight refers to "a flight that was not operated,
but was in the carrier's computer reservation system within seven days of the scheduled
departure." A "diverted" flight refers to "a flight which is operated from the scheduled
origin point to a point other than the scheduled destination point in the carrier's
published schedule." Figure 1-2 (Air Travel Consumer Report (2007) [13]) depicts the
distribution of the overall causes of flight delays for July, 2007. We observe that Late
Arriving Aircraft Delay (representing delay propagating to downstream flights)
contributes the greatest level of delay among all categories. Also note the percentage of
flights delayed as a result of late arriving aircraft (9.87%) is about the same as the
percentage of flights delayed by the NAS, extreme weather, and security (8.45% + 1.31%
1 Source: Air Travel Consumer Report [13]
+ 0.10% = 9.86%). This suggests, on average, for each flight delayed by extreme weather,
the NAS, and security, another flight is delayed due to the propagation of this delay. In
other words, when a total of 17.91% (8.05% + 1.31% + 8.45% + 0.1%) of flights are











Figure 1-2: Overall causes of flight delay for July, 2007
1.4 Airline Scheduling Practice
Between 1995 and 2000, in an attempt to improve flight on-time performance, U.S.
carriers responded to the 15-OTP metric by increasing the scheduled gate-to-gate times,
namely block times, for flights (Shumsky (1993) [23] and Hall (1999) [17]). During that
period, the total block hours were increased from 10,361,858 to 12,034,337 on average
for the major network carriers (Airline Data Project [21]). Caulkins et al. (1993) [11]
argue that airlines operating in congested airports are disadvantaged by the 15-OTP
metric compared to airlines flying to less congested secondary airports. This is a result
of two factors: (1) ground delay programs are implemented more frequently at these
congested airports; and (2) airlines flying into these congested airports are subject to
reduced efficiency because they schedule more buffers in their ground turn time in an
attempt to respond to this uncertainty. In this thesis, we examine the effects of airport
locations and flight scheduling practices on aircraft and passenger delays.
1.5 Passenger Delays
Barnhart and Bratu conducted a study on airline passenger delays and showed that 15-
OTP does not accurately measure the amount of passenger delay. They developed an
algorithm, called the Passenger Delay Calculator, to compute passenger delay statistics.
Using actual passenger bookings and flight operations information from a major US
airline, they discovered that simple flight-based statistics tend to underestimate
passenger delays because passengers whose travel plans are disrupted by cancelled
flights or missed connections (namely, disrupted passengers) experience much longer
delays on average than are reported for the corresponding flights. They proposed a new
metric based on the number of disrupted passengers and argued that it better
represented airline schedule reliability as experienced by passengers than did the
existing metric.
In other research, including that of Wang and Sherry (2006) [24] and Ball, Lovell,
Mukherjee and Subramanian (2005) [1], similar results have been derived. For instance,
Wang (2007) [25] estimates that 40% of the total trip delays accrued by passengers on
single segment flights are the result of delays due to cancelled flights, despite that only
a very small fraction of fights are cancelled. The remaining 60% of total trip delays are
attributed to flight delays. However, unlike the Passenger Delay Calculator developed
22
by Barnhart and Bratu, Sherry and Wang's analysis only considers non-stop segment
data and excludes the possibility of disruptions due to missed connections.
1.6 Data for the Assessment of Airline Operational Performance
The major data source for assessing airline operational performance in this thesis comes
from BTS. It includes T-100, The Airline Origin and Destination Survey (also known as
DB1B), Flight On-Time Performance (also known as ASQP), and the FAA Aircraft
Registry Database. The description of each data file is given in the following.
T-100 Domestic Segment (U.S. Carriers) contains domestic non-stop segment data
reported by U.S. air carriers by month. Useful information includes carrier, origin,
destination, available capacity, number of scheduled departures, number of performed
departures, number of passengers on each flight segment, and load factor when both
origin and destination airports are located within the boundaries of the United States
and its territories. The number of passengers in this data file is monthly aggregated over
each flight segment (BTS (2006) [10]).
DB1B is a 10% sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers collected by the Office of
Airline Information of the BTS. It consists of 3 parts: DB1B Coupon, DB1B Market, and
DB1B Tickets, described as follows.
DBIB Coupon provides coupon-specific information for each domestic itinerary of
the Origin and Destination Survey, such as the operating carrier, origin and
destination airports, and number of passengers, fare class, coupon type, trip
break indicator, and distance. The number of passengers in this data file is
quarterly aggregated over each domestic itinerary and the itineraries do not
contain flight schedules (BTS (2006) [6]).
DBIB Market contains directional market characteristics of each domestic itinerary
of the Origin and Destination Survey, such as the reporting carrier, origin and
destination airport, prorated market fare, number of market coupons, market
miles flown, and carrier change indicators (BTS (2006) [7]).
DB1B Ticket contains summary characteristics of each domestic itinerary on the
Origin and Destination Survey, including the reporting carrier, itinerary fare,
number of passengers, originating airport, roundtrip indicator, and miles flown.
The number of passengers reported in this data file is quarterly aggregated over
each domestic itinerary and the itineraries do not contain flight schedules (BTS
(2006) [8]).
Flight On-Time Performance (ASQP) contains daily on-time arrival data for non-stop
domestic flights by major air carriers, and provides information such as departure and
arrival delays, origin and destination airports, flight numbers, scheduled and actual
departure and arrival times, cancelled or diverted flights, taxi-out and taxi-in times, air
time, and non-stop distance (BTS (2006) [5]).
FAA Aircraft Registry Database is a database of all aircraft registered in the U.S. We
use this database to match an aircraft tail number to an aircraft type. Once the aircraft
types are identified, we can obtain the seating capacity information from the target
airline's official website (FAA [14]).
In summary, T-100 and DB1B contain only passenger segment or route information (no
flight schedule information) and ASQP provides only flight information (no passenger
information). The FAA Aircraft Registry Database is used to obtain the flight seating
capacity information. Due to the lack of detailed passenger itinerary and booking
information, special methods are required in order to quantify passenger delays. In
particular, we need algorithms that generate detailed passenger itineraries and estimate
passenger demand on each itinerary.
1.7 Definitions
To facilitate the description of our analysis, we introduce the following notations and
definitions. A non-stop flight f, also referred to as a flight leg, is associated with a flight
number, an origin airport, a destination airport, a Planned Departure Time, PDT(f), and a
Planned Arrival Time, PAT(f). In operations, AAT(f) stands for the Actual Arrival Time of
flightf at the gate and ADT(f), the Actual Departure Time from the gate. The Flight Arrival
Delay of flight f, denoted by FAD(f), equals max(AAT(f) - PAT(f); 0); the Flight Departure
Delay, denoted by FDD(f), equals max(ADT(f) - PDT(f); 0).
A Scheduled Itinerary, (SI) is a sequence of scheduled flights serving a group of
passengers. The group of passengers on a given SI is referred to as a Scheduled Passenger
Type (SPT). If a SI corresponding to a given SPT has only one flight then, passengers are
local, otherwise they are connecting. For a given day of operations, passengers are served
on a sequence of flights, called the Actual Itinerary (AI). We define an actual passenger
type APT(s,u) as the group of passengers originally scheduled on SI s who actually
travel on SI u. Other useful definitions are the Minimum Connecting Time (MCT); that is,
the minimum time required to walk between the arrival and departure gates of the
consecutive flights, and Maximum Layover Time (MLT); that is, the maximum allowable
waiting time at a connecting airport between the previous flight's arrival and the next
flight's departure. A passenger is disrupted if:
* One or more of the flights in his/her scheduled itinerary is canceled; or
* The time between consecutive flights in his/her scheduled itinerary is less than
the MCT; In this case, the passenger misses connections.
Additionally, in our future discussion, we adopt the conventional definition of route
(the sequence of one or more flight legs serving an origin/destination airport pair); in
other words, flight legs from an origin airport o to a destination airport d constitute a
route, while the return flight legs from d to o represent a different route, called the
opposite route.
1.8 Thesis Contributions
The primary goal of this thesis is to investigate the differences between a major U.S.
legacy carrier (labeled as "Airline A" in this thesis) and a major U.S. low-cost carrier
(labeled as "Airline B" in this thesis) in terms of their flight on-time performances,
network structures, scheduling practices, and passenger delays. Statistics will be
generated for both airlines on two different days in July 2006. The legacy carrier
operates a hub-and-spoke network in which three hubs serve 74 airports in the
domestic US. The low-cost carrier is the largest airline in the United States by number of
passengers carried domestically per year (as of December 31, 2007) and has consistently
received the lowest ratio of complaints per passenger boarded of all major US carriers.
We select the days such that they represent two scenarios: July 8, 2006 was a "low-
delay" day for both airlines as measured by fewer cancellations and higher flight on-
time performance; July 12, 2006 was a "high-delay" day with both airlines experiencing
more cancellations and greater delays. Additionally, July 8, 2006 was a Saturday while
July 12, 2006 was a Wednesday. In general, airlines schedule more flights on weekdays
and fewer flights on weekends, which is also the case for both airlines in this study.
We develop a 3-stage approach to quantify passenger delays using only the publicly
accessible data described in 1.6. In the first-stage, a new approach is used to generate
itineraries; in the second stage, we develop a linear integer programming model to
allocate passengers to the itineraries generated in the first stage; and in the third stage,
we use the Passenger Delay Calculator to compute passenger delay. The major
contribution of our methodology is that it provides a way to generate passenger
booking data for all scheduled flights using only publicly accessible data. Unlike
previous studies, the 3-stage approach is not restricted by the availability of proprietary
airline data and can be adopted to estimate itinerary-based passenger demand for any
U.S. airline included in the BTS database. Moreover, it can be used to compute delays
for local and connecting passengers and to provide a powerful tool for scenario
analysis. Further, it allows us to: (1) identify root causes of delays as well as the impact
throughout the network; (2) help gain insights about how passenger delay can be
reduced with different scheduling practices; and (3) guide the design of good on-time
performance metrics.
1.9 Thesis Outline
The framework we develop in this thesis includes the following objectives:
* Investigate the differences in the placement of slack time, often referred to as
schedule "padding," and other scheduling practices among airlines, and provide
the rationale behind the differences;
* Examine the sources of aircraft delays for different airlines and identify airports
contributing the majority of delays for each airline;
* Quantify and compare passenger delays between the legacy carrier and the low-
cost carrier;
* Use quantitative evidence to show that a better OTP metric should take into
account the carrier-specific characteristics and reflect passenger delays;
* Discuss future scenarios about trends in the airline industry, such as levels of
flight operations; and
Project passenger delays under different scenario representations within our
framework.
We explore the airlines' scheduling practices and the resulting impact on flight on-time
performance in Chapter 2. The analysis of flight delays is discussed in Chapter 3. We
develop the 3-stage approach to estimate passenger demand and passenger delay in
Chapter 4. Comparison of passenger delays between the legacy carrier and the low-cost
carrier is made in Chapter 5. Additionally, we establish relationships between
passenger delays and flight leg delays, cancellation rates, load factors, network
operations, passenger mix, and schedule designs. Chapter 6 provides conclusions and
recommendations for future work.
Chapter 2
Scheduling of Slack Time
2.1 Introduction
When designing schedules, airlines usually "pad" their schedules by inserting buffer or
slack time. The way airlines pad their schedules can have a significant impact upon on-
time performance and passenger delays. There are two methods of schedule "padding."
One is to plan slack into the ground turn time (i.e., the ground time to prepare an
aircraft for its next departure); the other is to plan slack into the block times (i.e., the
gate to gate times including taxi out, flying, and taxi in). Ground slack can reduce
departure delays caused by late incoming flights (i.e., propagated delays). However, it
has no effect on departure delays attributed to weather conditions, airport operations,
heavy traffic volume, air traffic control, etc., which are often referred to as NAS delays.
These departure delays in turn cause arrival delays, and hence, ground slack does not
help to reduce arrival delays. Slack in block times, however, can reduce the effects of
NAS delays and increase on-time arrival performance. This is the case when a planned
block time exceeds the actual block time resulting in an actual arrival time at the
destination airport that is earlier than expected when adding the planned block time to
the actual departure time. In Section 2.2, we derive mathematical formulas, given a
flight schedule as planned and as operated, for obtaining planned turn time, actual turn
time, actual turn time slack, planned block time, actual block time, and actual block
time slack. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we apply the methodology from Section 2.2 to obtain
relevant statistics for the legacy network carrier and the low-cost carrier. In Section 2.5,
we explain the rationale behind the statistics for each airline.
2.2 Methodology
Notations:
*:o PDT: Planned Departure Time
. ADT: Actual Departure Time
o PAT: Planned Arrival Time
. AAT: Actual Arrival Time
o PTTij: Planned Turn Time between flight i and flight j
o ATTi1 : Actual Turn Time between flight i and flight j
O ATTSiq: Actual Turn Time Slack (i.e., the difference between PTTi1 and ATTij)
. PBLK: Planned Block Time
o ABLK: Actual Block Time
o ABLKSiq: Actual Block Time Slack (i.e., the difference between PBLKi and ABLKij)
o ATSiq: Actual Total Slack (i.e., the sum of ATTSiJ and ABLKSjq)
PTTi = PDT - PAT
ATTiJ = ADT - AAT
ATTSZ = PTT - ATTzi = (PDT - PAT) - (ADT - AAT)
PBLKi = PATi - PDTi
ABLKi = AATi - ADTi
ABLKSij = PBLKi - ABLKi = (PATi - PDTi) - (AATi - ADTi)
ATSi = ATTSqj + ABLKSij
Table 2-1: Formulas for computing PTT, ATT, ATTS, PBLK, ABLK, ABLKS, and ATS
PDT, ADT, PAT, and AAT are available in the ASQP data2. In the following sections, we
will present, for each airline, the average statistics, the airport-specific statistics, and arc-
specific (airport origin-destination pair for a single flight segment) statistics.
Comparisons will be made between the common airports and arcs shared by the legacy
network carrier and the low cost-carrier.
2.3 Slack Time Statistics
Table 2-2 lists the average PTT, ATT, ATTS, PBLK, ABLK, ABLKS, and ATS of the
legacy network carrier and the low-cost carrier, respectively, on July 8, 2006 and July 12,
2006. The average statistics come from dividing the summary statistics by the number
of performed departures for each airline. Therefore, it represents an overall measure of
each airline's performance.
Average PTT ATT PTT-ATT = ATTS PBLK ABLK PBLK-ABLK = ABLKS ATS+ABLKS=ATS
A0708 199.48 215.10 -15.62 522.33 508.80 13.53 -2.09
A0712 171.10 212.80 -41.70 644.35 661.20 -16.85 -58.55
B0708 129.85 169.69 -39.83 558.54 522.05 36.50 -3.33
B0712 148.14 193.69 -45.55 692.07 669.92 22.15 -23.4
Table 2-2: The average PTT, ATT, ATTS, PBLK, ABLK, ABLKS, and ATS per flight (in minutes)
In Table 2-2, a more positive ATTS (ABLKS) means a greater actual turn time slack
(actual block time slack) for the airline. A negative ATTS (ABLKS) means the planned
buffer was insufficient and as a result, ATT (ABLK) was greater than PTT (PBLK).
Notice the following:
2 That is, the Airline On-Time Performance Data. Available:
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Tables.asp ?DB_ID=120&DB_Name=Airline%200n-
Time%2 OPerformance%2 OData&DB_Short_Name=On- Time [5].
* Overall, the daily average PTT and ATT per aircraft were higher for Airline A
than for Airline B per day. On the other hand, the average PBLK and ABLK per
aircraft were slightly higher for Airline B than for Airline A per day.
* The daily average ATTS was negative for both airlines. However, Airline A had
a greater ATTS (than Airline B) on average per aircraft while Airline B had a
greater ABLKS (than Airline A) on average per aircraft per day. This difference
implies Airline A has more slack than Airline B in its ground turn time, while
Airline B has more slack than Airline A in its block time.
* The average RTB was also negative for both airlines. On July 8, the ATS was just
below zero for both airlines but on July 12, Airline A had an ATS value that was
more than two times than that of Airline B. This suggests that Airline A is much
more severely impacted, as measured by delay minutes, than Airline B when
NAS delays are present.
2.3.1 Airport-Specific PTT and ATT Comparisons
We compute the PTT and ATT between common airports of Airline A and Airline B.
We index these airports from 1 to 39. Figure 2-1 to Figure 2-4 give comparisons in PTT
and ATT of common airports shared by both Airline A and Airline B. Again, we see
Airline A tends to plan much higher ground turn times. Almost every airport of Airline
A has a greater PTT than that of Airline B. Furthermore, notice Airline B plans almost
identical amounts of PTT at each airport. Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6 depict the
differences between ATT and PTT of each airline on July 8, 2006 and July 12, 2006,
respectively. For illustration purposes, we are subtracting PTT from ATT in Figure 2-5
and Figure 2-6. Hence, a positive value indicates a negative ATTS or insufficient
planned buffer. We observe:
* On July 8, 2006, both airlines' ATT values were only slightly greater than their
PTT values (Figure 2-5). Further, the differences were increased on July 12, 2006
for both airlines (Figure 2-6). Overall, the differences of ATT and PTT for Airline
B took on positive but insignificant values while Airline A had some negative
values but several of its airports showed very significant positive differences.
* Airline B's performance (i.e., the difference of ATT and PTT) at different airports
was more homogenous and less affected during the "high-delay" day than
Airline A. Airline B's value of actual minus planned turn time was less than
twenty minutes except for one 40-minute instance, while Airline A's value was
highly variable, with several instances at or exceeding 60 minutes and one as
great as more than 150 minutes.
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Figure 2-1: July 8: PTT comparison between the common airports of the two airlines
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Figure 2-2: July 12: PTT comparison between the common airports of the two airlines
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Figure 2-4: July 12: ATT comparison between the common airports of the two airlines
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Figure 2-6: July 12: Comparison of (ATT-PTT) between the airlines' common airports
2.3.2 Arc-Specific PBLK and ABLK Comparisons
Previous analysis focuses on the comparisons between the common airports of Airline
A and Airline B in PTT, ATT, and ATTS. In this section, the common arcs of the two
airlines are examined. Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 list the average arrival delays, PBLK,
ABLK, and ABLKS of each airline on July 8, 2006 and July 12, 2006, respectively. We
observe the following:
* Airline A and Airline B do not share many common arcs in their network
operations. This implies Airline A and Airline B have very different network
structures.
* For most of the common arcs, we see Airline B requires less actual block time
than Airline A and although the planned block times of A and B are not so
different, the effect is that Airline B has more slack in its block times as indicated
by its more positive ABLKS values, and in doing so absorbs arrival delays to
reduce the downstream propagation of delays. This result is consistent with our
previous findings on the average ABLKS comparisons between Airline A and
Airline B.
* Airline B must be delayed in departing Airport 20 because the arrival delay
exceeds the difference in actual minus planned block times. This is not true for
Airline A, so it suggests the delays are related to Airline B's operation not to NAS
conditions in Airport 20.
Origin Dest Avg. Arrival Avg. Arrival PBLK ABLK ABLKS PBLK ABLK ABLKS
Airport Airport Delay Delay (Airline B) (Airline B) (Airline B) (Airline A) (Airline A) (Airline A)
Index Index hours\minutes hours\minutes hours\minutes hours\minutes hours\minutes hours\minutes
minutes minutes
4 11 0 0 4:20 4:04 16 4:22 4:11 11
4 20 0 0 4:15 3:48 27 4:16 4:00 16
11 4 0 0 4:05 3:49 16 3:58 3:58 0
20 4 17 6 3:50 3:52 -2 3:47 3:58 -11
Table 2-3: Average arrival delay, PBLK, ABLK, and ABLKS for common arcs on July 8, 2006
Origin Dest Avg. Arrival Avg. Arrival PBLK ABLK ABLKS PBLK ABLK ABLKS
Airport Airport Delay Delay (Airline B) (Airline B) (Airline B) (Airline A) (Airline A) (Airline A)
Index Index (Airline B) (Airline ) hours\minutes hours\minutes hours\minutes hours\minutes hours\minutes hours\minutes
minutes minutes
3 4 8.6 10 1:10 1:07 3 1:20 1:35 -15
4 3 7.4 0 1:10 1:05 5 1:26 1:22 4
4 11 2 2.3 4:20 4:19 1 4:22 4:15 7
4 20 0 4.5 4:15 3:53 22 4:09 4:09 0
11 4 0 36.7 4:05 3:46 19 3:56 4:13 -17
20 4 28 0 3:50 3:35 15 3:49 3:44 5
Table 2-4: Average arrival delay, PBLK, ABLK, and ABLKS for common arcs on July 12, 2006
2.3.3 Ground Delay Programs
The goal of Ground Delay Programs (GDP) is to control air traffic volume to airports
where the projected traffic demand is expected to exceed the airport's acceptance rate
for a lengthy period of time. Lengthy periods of such instances are normally a result of
the airport's acceptance rate being reduced by external factors. The most common
reason for a reduction in acceptance rates is inclement weather, such as low ceilings and
visibility. GDPs work as follows: Flights that are destined to the affected airport are
issued Controlled Departure Times (CDTs) at their point of departure. Flights that have
been issued CDTs cannot depart until their assigned CDT. CDTs are calculated in such
a way as to meter the rate that traffic arrives at the affected airport; ensuring that
demand is equal to the acceptance rate. The length of delays that result from the
implementation of a GDP is a factor of two things: (1) how much greater than the
acceptance rate the original demand was, and (2) for what length of time the original
demand is expected to exceed the acceptance rate (FAA [15]).
Metron Aviation provided GDP data for all the GDPs from April 1, 2007 to March 31,
2008. According to that, the percentages of airports that have GDPs for Airline A and
Airline B are 39% and 27%, respectively. Moreover, one of the major hubs of Airline A
had the highest number of issued GDPs (approximately 190) between 2007 and 2008
among all airports with ground holds. This implies a GDP was issued basically every
other day at this airport with an average actual GDP length of 505 minutes. On average,
Airline A has the largest share of traffic (roughly 53%) among all airlines with flights
into and/or out of this airport (BTS (2006) [4]). The total number of issued GDP's
between 2007 and 2008 was 218 at Airline A's major hubs and only 31 at Airline B's
major airports. These statistics, together with the analysis above, begin to explain why
Airline A tends to add more slack into its turn time than does Airline B.
2.3.4 Explanations of Planned Differences among the Airlines in
Scheduling Slack Time
We speculate the major reason for Airline A to have a higher average PTT and lower
average PBLK compared to Airline B has to do with the hub choices of Airline A. The
three major hubs for Airline A are very busy airports with high traffic levels. When bad
weather occurs, flights planned to arrive in these affected airports are subject to GDPs
to ensure that demand for runway capacity does not exceed the reduced amount
available in bad weather. Most of the low-cost carrier's major airports are not frequently
impacted by GDPs, while the hubs of Airline A are often impacted. Further, as a legacy
network carrier, Airline A performs a hub-and-spoke operation, which means a
significant percentage of its flights will either fly out or into its hubs. Additionally,
Airline A operates two banked hubs where a set of arriving flight legs are scheduled
closely with a set of departing flight legs to allow timely passenger connections between
arriving and departing flight legs. Delayed flight legs cause downstream delays to
aircraft, crews and passengers, resulting in growing flight delays and cancellations as
the day progresses. Under these conditions, it is an effective strategy for Airline A to
plan a higher average turn time because ground slack can reduce departure delays
caused by late incoming flights (i.e., propagated delays) at its major hubs. Block time
slack, however, is not effective in getting aircraft back on schedule at airports that
frequently implement ground holds. To do so, given average durations of 505 minutes
for GDPs, would require exorbitant and impractical amounts of slack to be included in
the planned block times. Airline B, which tends to fly into busy airports less frequently
and has fewer airports subject to ground delay programs, however, faces a different
situation. Adding more slack to its block times becomes a more effective strategy than
placing slack in ground times because block time slack for improve on-time arrival
performance.
2.3.5 Peaking vs. De-peaking
In a de-peaked schedule, aircraft need not wait on the ground for connecting passengers
and can therefore save turn time, which can lead to increased aircraft utilization.
Additionally, de-peaked schedules are more robust in the sense that demand for airport
capacity, at least on the part of the airline operating the de-peaked schedule, is spread
more evenly in time and its maximum is much less than that of a peaked schedule.
Hence, reductions in capacity can have less impact on de-peaked than peaked schedule.
Later analysis in this thesis shows that Airline A has only one de-peaked hub and two
peaked schedules. Airline B, however, has de-peaked schedules at all of its major
airports. Airline B, then, has shorter turn times and higher aircraft productivity. Airline
A, however, must schedule longer ground turn times to "catch" banks at the hubs and
to allow adequate time for arriving passengers to connect between flights. As indicated
by the positive differences between ATT and PTT in Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6, this slack
did not serve as a buffer. The most plausible reason is that flights were delayed in
departure due to the airlines' own problems, NAS, or security issues.
Chapter 3
Flight Delays and Cancellations
3.1 Introduction
Flight on-time performance has a direct impact on passenger delays. In this chapter, we
compare flight delays and cancellations of the legacy carrier to those of the low-cost
carrier on July 8, and July 12, in 2006. The flight delay analysis presented in this chapter
also helps explain the differences between the two airlines in scheduling practices
(discussed in Chapter 2) and passenger delays (to be discussed in Chapter 5). In Section
3.2, we compute and analyze flight performance statistics using information from the
BTS data. In Section 3.3, we quantify the sources of delays; i.e., whether a flight delay
was due to late incoming aircraft or due to other reasons.
3.2 Information of Flight Performance from the BTS Data
3.2.1 Flight Performance Statistics
Based on information from ASQP (BTS (2006) [5]), we compute the flight performance
statistics for Airline A and Airline B on July 8, 2006 and July 12, 2006 (shown in Table 3-
1). Our analysis is restricted to jet-operated flight legs because ASQP includes only jet-
operated flight leg information.
Airline A Airline B Airline A Airline B
(07/08/2006) (07/08/2006) (07/12/2006) (07/12/2006)
Number of flight operations 727 2698 922 3116
(domestic U.S.)
15-minute on time performance 87.60% 89.00% 60.60% 75.80%
(15-OTP)
Percentage of delayed flights* 12.40% 11.00% 39.40% 24.20%
(only flights operated)
Percentage of cancelled flights 0 0.44% 1.52% 0.89%
Average delay of operated flights 6.36 4.82 38.75 12.28
(minutes)
Average delay of flights with 19.36 17.5 67.16 25.74
positive delays (minutes)3
* Delayed flights are the flights with delays greater than 15 minutes
Table 3-1: Flight delay statistics based on ASQP
From Table 3-1, we observe the following for July 8, 2006:
* Airline B operated 3.7 times more domestic flights than Airline A.
* Airline A and Airline B achieved comparable 15-OTP.
* Airline A had no cancellations while Airline B had 0.44% of flights cancelled.
* The average delay of Airline A's operated flights (6.36 minutes) was higher than
that of Airline B's operated flights (4.82 minutes).
* The percentage of Airline A's delayed flights (12.40%) was higher than that of
Airline B's delayed flights (11.00%).
* For flights that experienced positive delays, the average delay for Airline A was
slightly higher than that for Airline B.
3 The average flight delay (only for flights that experienced positive delays) for Airline A was 41.52
minutes and for Airline B 8.0 minutes in July 2006.
For July 12, 2006, we observe the following:
* Airline B operated 3.4 times more domestic flights than Airline A.
* Both airlines had worse performance than that on July 8, 2006.
* Compared to July 8, the numbers of flight operations were increased by a factor
of 1.27 for Airline A and 1.15 for Airline B, respectively.
* Airline B achieved a higher 15-OTP than Airline A.
* The average delay of Airline A's operated flights was 3.16 times higher than that
of Airline B's operated flights.
* The percentage of Airline A's delayed flights (39.40%) was higher than that of
Airline B's delayed flights (24.20%).
* For flights that experienced positive delays, the average delay for Airline A was
2.61 times higher than that for Airline B.
* Compared to July 8, the average delay of flights with positive delays was
increased by a factor of 3.47 for Airline A and a factor of 1.47 for Airline B.
* The percentage of delayed flights was increased by a factor of 3.18 for Airline A
and 2.18 for Airline B.
3.2.2 Causes of Flight Cancellations and Delays
This section investigates the causes of flight delays and cancellations, using the U.S.
DOT's definition. In Chapter 1, we present the DOT-defined causes of flight delays as:
carrier delay, extreme weather delay, national aviation system (NAS) delay, security
delay, and late arriving aircraft delay. In the ASQP data, the amount of delay attributed
by each of the above-mentioned causes is reported. For example, a flight with a total
arrival delay of 107 minutes has 32 minutes delay attributable to carrier delay, 4
minutes attributable to NAS delay, and 71 minutes attributable to late aircraft delay.
With such information, we compute the percentage of arrival delay attributed by each
cause. In Figure 3-1, we depict these percentages for Airline A on July 8 and July 12,
respectively. In Figure 3-2, we depict these percentages for Airline B on July 8 and July
12, respectively (BTS (2006) [5]).
On the "high-delay" day of July 12, we find extreme weather problems contributed 8%
of the total arrival delay to Airline A's operation while only 4% to Airline B's operation.
By comparing the amount of delay attributed to extreme weather conditions to the
amount of total departure delay and arrival delay, respectively, we conclude that
departure delays represented 90.03% of the total delay caused by extreme weather in
Airline A's system. In other words, the extreme weather conditions resulted in GDPs
that kept aircraft on the ground, delaying departures, at departure airports. Moreover,
one hub in Airline A's network contributed 94.14% of the total delays caused by
weather and 74.04% of the total departure delays caused by weather. A distinction
between the two airlines is that Airline A suffered almost three times more NAS delay
than Airline B. On July 12, NAS delay accounted for nearly half of the total delay in
Airline A's system. NAS delay is a mixed result of non-extreme weather conditions,
airport operations, heavy traffic volume, air traffic control, etc. We think the difference
in NAS delay is attributable to the fact that Airline A has a significant percentage of





























Figure 3-2: Causes of flight delay for Airline B on July 8 (left) and July 12 (right) in 2006
Also on the "high-delay" day, out of the fourteen flight cancellations of Airline A, seven
of them (half of the cancellations) were due to weather problems at four airports. Of
these seven cancelled flights due to weather problems, there were four departures from
a single hub. All cancellations of Airline B, however, arose from carrier problems rather
than weather.
3.2.3 Weighted 15-OTP Arrival Rates
Table 3-2 provides rankings of the 15-OTP arrival performance over all US airlines by
major airports in July 2006, reported by the BTS [5]. We compute the percentage of
flights in Airline A's and Airline B's networks based on their respective T-100 Segment
data, which contains information regarding the total number of flight departures
performed in each month and the origin/destination airports of these flights. We then
multiply these percentages of flights by the 15-OTP rates in Table 3-2 to obtain
weighted 15-OTP rates at each major airport for Airline A and Airline B (Table 3-3 and
Table 3-4). We then make the following observations:
* Airline A has approximately 80% of its flights operating at the 31 busiest US
airports. T-100 segment data reports that Airline A schedules and performs flight
operations at all 31 airports.
* Airline B has only approximately 50% of flights operating at the 31 busiest US
airports. T-100 segment data reports that Airline B schedules and performs flight
operations at only 16 of the 31 airports.
* The sum of the weighted 15-OTP for Airline A is 70% and for Airline B is 75%.
The overall 15-OTP arrival performances of the two airlines in July 2006,
respectively, are 69% for Airline A and 77.7% for Airline B, according to Air
Travel Consumer Report [13]. Airline A's performance can therefore, be
estimated as a function of the performance at the major airports at which it
operates. Airline B's performance, however, is better than that of the major
airports at which it operates. Hence, Airline A's reliability is impacted to a
greater extent by changes in capacity and demand at the major airports.
Rank July 2006 %
1 Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 85.05
2 Cincinnati, OH (CVG) 82.00
3 Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN (MSP) 80.90
4 Dallas/Ft.Worth, TX (DFW) 80.54
5 Oakland, CA (OAK) 79.52
6 Denver, CO (DEN) 78.97
7 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 78.80
8 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 77.38
9 Detroit, MI (DTW) 76.83
10 San Diego, CA (SAN) 76.70
11 San Francisco, CA (SFO) 76.39
12 Orlando, FL (MCO) 75.71
13 Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 75.09
14 Chicago, IL (MDW) 74.55
15 Fort Lauderdale, FL (FLL) 74.17
16 Baltimore, MD (BWI) 74.11
17 Tampa, FL (TPA) 73.09
18 Houston, TX (IAH) 73.01
19 Atlanta, GA (ATL) 72.95
20 Charlotte, NC (CLT) 72.60
21 Seattle, WA (SEA) 72.57
22 Miami, FL (MIA) 70.37
23 Washington, DC (DCA) 70.19
24 Chicago, IL (ORD) 69.44
25 Boston, MA (BOS) 68.51
26 Washington, DC (IAD) 67.67
27 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 67.40
28 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 64.19
29 New York, NY (JFK) 62.98
30 New York, NY (LGA) 59.94
31 Newark, NJ (EWR) 59.03
(Percent On-Time)
Table 3-2: Ranking of major airport on-time arrival performance in July 2006
Source: BTS, Airline On-Time Data
CVG 1 0.00 82.00 0.00
MSP 136 0.63 80.90 0.51
DFW 326 1.52 80.54 1.22
OAK 91 0.42 79.52 0.34
DEN 422 1.96 78.97 1.55
PHX 333 1.55 78.80 1.22
LAX 783 3.65 77.38 2.82
DTW 184 0.86 76.83 0.66
SAN 364 1.69 76.70 1.30
SFO 481 2.24 76.39 1.71
MCO 614 2.86 75.71 2.16
LAS 520 2.42 75.09 1.82
MDW 94 0.44 74.55 0.33
FLL 449 2.09 74.17 1.55
BWI 215 1.00 74.11 0.74
TPA 383 1.78 73.09 1.30
IAH 7699 35.85 73.01 26.17
ATL 413 1.92 72.95 1.40
CLT 1 0.00 72.60 0.00
SEA 492 2.29 72.57 1.66
MIA 313 1.46 70.37 1.03
DCA 364 1.69 70.19 1.19
ORD 449 2.09 69.44 1.45
BOS 569 2.65 68.51 1.82
IAD 9 0.04 67.67 0.03
PIT 59 0.27 67.40 0.19
PHL 220 1.02 64.19 0.66
JFK 93 0.43 62.98 0.27
LGA 378 1.76 59.94 1.05
EWR 4930 22.95 59.03 13.55
Table 3-3: Weighted major airport on-time arrival performance in July 2006 of Airline A
85.05 0.36SLC 0.43
Table 3-4: Weighted major airport on-time arrival performance in July 2006 of Airline B
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3.3 Independent Delay and Propagated Delay
We classify all flight delay into the following two types of delay:
* Propagated Delay is flight delay caused by waiting for incoming aircraft. This
delay is a function of an aircraft's routing. Late arriving aircraft is the sole
cause of propagated delay. In Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2, we show that
propagated delay on July 8 (July 12) accounts for approximately 31% (33%) of
total arrival delay for Airline A, and 52% (57%) of the total arrival delay for
Airline B.
* Independent Delay is flight delay caused by all reasons other than delay
propagation4 . In Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2, we show that independent delay
on July 8 (July 12) accounts for approximately 69% (67%) of total arrival delay
for Airline A, and 48% (43%) of the total arrival delay for Airline B.
Notice in Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2, on July 8 and July 12, only 45% and 49% of
independent arrival delays propagated to downstream flights for Airline A (i.e.,
translated into propagated delay), respectively. For Airline B, 100% of independent
arrival delays' propagated to downstream flights on both days.
4 Air carrier delay, extreme weather delay, NAS delay, and/or security delay cause independent delay. In
particular, airport congestion affects the degree of independent delay of arrivals, while carrier delays,
adverse weather conditions, airport operations, heavy traffic volume, and/or air traffic control affects the
degree of independent delay of departures.
s Note on both days the percentages of delayed aircraft (52% and 57%, respectively) were greater than the
sum of percentages of weather delay, carrier delay, NAS delay, and security delay (48% and 43%,
respectively)
3.3.1 Computation of the Independent and Propagated Delay
Lan, Clarke, and Barnhart (2006) [20] have developed a way to compute propagated
delays and independent delays. Figure 3-3 illustrates the concepts of propagated delays
(PD) as well as independent arrival delays (IAD) and independent departure delays
(IDD). The formulas are provided in Table 3-5.
PAT AAT
P T ADTAD
Planned flight leg -------- Actual flight leg
Figure 3-3: Scheme for computing PD, IDD, and IAD
Notations:
TDD: Total Departure Delay
PDT: Planned Departure Time
ADT: Actual Departure Time
TAD: Total Arrival Delay
PAT: Planned Arrival Time
AAT: Actual Arrival Time
PDi1: Propagated Delay of flight j due to flight i
IDD: Independent Departure Delay
IAD: Independent Arrival Delay
MTTii : Minimum Turn Time between flight i and flight j (aircraft type dependent)
Slacki: Slack planned into ground turn time between flight i and flight j
PTTij: Planned Turn Time between flight i and flight j
Table 3-5: Formulas for computing Slack, PD, IDD, and IAD
PTTi = PDT - PAT
Slackij = PTTi - MTT = PDT - PATi- MTTij
TADi = AAT - PATi
PDij = MAX (TADi - Slacki, 0) = MAX (AATi- PATi - PDT + PATi+ MTTij, 0)
= MAX (AATi + MTT - PDT, 0)
IDD= TDDj- PDi
IADj= TAD, - PDi
Our approach in this study will consist of four major steps:
1. Compute the Slack, PD, IDD, and IAD of each flight segment recorded in ASQP.
This procedure will be applied to both Airline A and Airline B. A useful
technique, tail number tracing, is described as follows:
a) Group flights with the same tail number (indicating the same aircraft).
b) For each group, sort the flights by PDT from the earliest scheduled to the
latest scheduled and then apply formulas provided in Table 3-2 to each
group.
2. Compute and compare the average PD, IDD, and IAD of all flights operated in
Airline A's and Airline B's systems, respectively.
3. For each airline, compute the contribution (percentage) of IDD and IAD from
each airport and identify the airports that are major sources of delays in this
system.
* The total IDD of an airport is the sum of IDD for each flight leg that
departs the airport.
* The total IAD of an airport is the sum of IAD for each flight leg that
arrives at the airport.
* The total PD of an airport is the sum of PD for each flight arriving at and
departing the airport.
4. For each airline, compute the average IDD and IAD at each airport and compare
these average delays among airports in the system.
* The average IDD of an airport is the sum of IDD for each flight leg that
departs the airport divided by the total number of flight legs departing the
airport.
The average IAD of an airport is the sum of IAD for each flight leg that
arrives at the airport divided by the total number of flight legs arriving at
the airport.
3.3.2 PD, IDD, and IAD Results
Table 3-6 displays the average PD, IDD, IAD, and the percentage of flights experiencing
delay propagation for Airline A and Airline B, respectively.
Total Number of Percent of
PD IDD IAD
AVERAGE (minutes) (minutes) (minutes) Number Flights Flights(minutes) (minutes) (minutes)
of Flights with PD with PD
Airline A
1.58 5.1 3.48 727 25 3.4%(07/08/06)
Airline A
12.48 20.65 25.43 922 121 13%(07/12/06)
Airline B 2 4.74 1.83 2686 188 7%(07/08/06)
Airline B 6.19 7.27 4.63 3116 580 18.7%(07/12/06)
Table 3-6: The average PD, IDD, and IAD (in minutes)
Note the average IDD and IAD of Airline A are significantly greater than those of
Airline B on July 12, 2006, the "high-delay" day. Moreover, IDD plus IAD are together
more than triple the propagated delay for Airline A on that day. For Airline B, IDD
plus IAD is almost double that of PD. Airline A experienced twice as much average PD
as Airline B on July 12; however, the percentages of flights experiencing delay
propagation were higher for Airline B than for Airline A on both days. The fact that
Airline A had a smaller percentage of flights experiencing delay propagation but
greater average propagated delay on the "high-delay" day perhaps has to do with its
airport choices and hub-and-spoke operation; in particular, Airline A has a higher
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percentage of flights connecting at busy airports and two of its major hubs are located
where bad weather can often reduce airport capacity and affect flight take-off and
landings. Therefore, when bad weather occurs, flights into these locations are delayed
by ground holds, while most of Airline B's major airports are not as prone to delays.
When delays occur at Airline A's airports, the delay that propagates to downstream
flights is likely to be larger than that of Airline B. More flights experience delay
propagation for Airline B because there is little turn time slack in its operation and an
arrival delay is likely to propagate to the next flight, unlike Airline A, which has
relatively more turn time slack.
The following section quantifies the amount of delay contributed by the major airports
of Airline A and Airline B, respectively.
3.3.3 IDD, IAD, and PD Results by Airport
In this section, we present delay statistics by airport for each airline and then compare
average delay per aircraft at the major airports of Airline A and Airline B. Figures 3-4 to
3-7 display IDD, IAD and PD by airport for both airlines. We index airports of Airline A
from 1 to 54 and airports of Airline B from 1 to 60. For Airline A, hub airports are 1, 5,
and 26. For Airline B, "hub" airports are 1, 5, 7, 9, and 14. Evaluating IDD and IAD by
airport provides useful information regarding the total independent delays contributed
by each airport in an airline's network. We also compare the average delay per aircraft
at the major airports of Airline A and Airline B (Table 3-7).
Statistics by Airport for July 8, 2006
For Airline A, the airport with the largest values of IDD, IAD, and PD was one of the
airline's hubs. In particular, that hub contributed 62.55% of the total IDD, 49.91% of the
total IAD, and 49.48% of the total PD to the entire system.
For Airline B, the airport with the largest values of IDD, IAD and PD is also one of the
airline's "hubs". Specifically, this "hub" contributed 12.67% of the total IDD, 14.76% of
the total IAD, and 7.42% of the total PD. Another major airport of Airline B contributed
the second largest percentage of IDD (9.75%) and PD (7.09%) to the entire system and
only 3.75% of IAD. A third airport in Airline B's network contributed 9.4% of IDD,
12.87% of the IAD, and 6.32% of the PD to the entire system. Interestingly, these 3
airports contributed far less, percentage-wise, of the system-wide IDD, IAD, and PD
than does a single airport in Airline A's network.
Statistics by Airport for July 12, 2006
For Airline A, 44.95% of IDD, 42.59% of IAD, and 42.69% of PD came from its three
hubs. In particular, to the entire system, one hub contributed 20.09% of the total IDD,
22.36% of the total IAD, and 34.25% of the total PD; a second hub contributed 16.37% of
the total IDD, 13.97% of the total IAD, and 4.48% of the total PD; and the third hub
contributed 8.49% of the total IDD, 6.26% of the total IAD, and 3.95% of the total PD.
For Airline B, 36.81% of IDD, 39% of IAD, and 25.38% of PD came from four airports. In
particular, to the entire system, one airport contributed 15.69% of the total IDD, 24.35%
of the total IAD, and 8.59% of the total PD; another contributed 12.85% of the total IDD,
8.22% of the total IAD, and 5.92% of the total PD; a third contributed 6.61% of the total
IDD, 7.35% of the total IAD, and 2.33% of the total PD; and the fourth contributed 8.27%
of the total IDD, 6.43% of the total IAD, and 10.87% of the total PD.
Observations from the Statistics
On July 8, 7 (4) airports accounted for 100% (80%) of the PD in Airline A's network
while 57 (23) airports accounted for the PD in Airline B's network. On July 12, 37 (12)
airports accounted for 100% (80%) of the PD in Airline A's network while 60 (27)
airports accounted for the delay in Airline B's network. We believe the fact that Airline
B has delay propagation spread among many more airports than Airline A is due to
Airline B's scheduling practice of limiting turn time slack.
Figure 3-4: Airline A (07/08/2006): IDD, IAD, and PD by airport
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Figure 3-6: Airline B (07/08/2006): IDD, IAD, and PD by airport
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Figure 3-7: Airline B (07/12/2006): IDD, IAD, and PD by airport
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Comparison of Average PD, IAD, and IDD Statistics for Both Airlines
As the above statistics indicate, for both airlines, the majority of IDD, IAD, and PD were
contributed by their major airports, as expected. However, when the airport delay
statistics are normalized by the number of flight operations at that airport, as shown in
Table 3-7, we find that the magnitudes of independent delay per flight were much less
for the major airports of Airline B than for those of Airline A on July 12. For instance,
IDD (IAD) per flight was 17.17 minutes (27.66 minutes), 8.96 minutes (10.5 minutes),
and 28 minutes (27.18 minutes) for the three major hubs of Airline A, respectively. IDD
(IAD) per flight was only 5.81 minutes (3.76 minutes), 7.53 minutes (11.85 minutes), 3.05
minutes (0 minutes), 5.01 minutes (3.92 minutes), and 2.47 minutes (1.37 minutes) for
the five major airports of Airline B, respectively.
We also compute the average IDD, IAD, and PD per flight over Airline A's three major
hubs and Airline B's five major "hubs" on July 12, as follows.
July 12, 2006
bA ~iiA 13.77 17.98 6.62
H . 4.96 4.81 6.41
A B 2.78 3.74 1.03
Airline A experienced 2.78 (3.74) times more average IDD (IAD) per flight over its three
major hubs than did Airline B. Airline A had a slightly higher average PD per flight
over its three major hubs (1.03 times as much as Airline B's PD value). We believe this
difference resides in the fact that Airline A has a significant percentage of flights flying
into or out of hubs with high congestion. Because independent delays can often be
attributed to airport congestion, higher NAS delays mean higher degrees of congestion
and hence, more independent delays. As shown in 3.2.2, NAS delay accounted for
nearly half of total delay in Airline A's network, while it accounted for only 17% in
Airline B's network on July 12, 2006.
We also compute the changes in IDD, IAD, and PD per flight (in minutes and percent)
between July 8 and July 12 for both airlines. These results are displayed in Table 3-8. We
find both independent delay and propagated delay at two hubs of Airline A are
significantly greater on July 12, 2006, the "high-delay" day, than on July 8, 2006, the
"low delay" day. In terms of absolute differences, Hub 2 had an increase of 15.81
minutes for IDD per flight, 26.89 minutes for IAD per flight, and 15.57 minutes for PD
per flight on July 12. Hub 3 had an increase of 26.97 minutes for IDD per flight, 26.77
minutes for IAD per flight, and 6.31 minutes for PD per flight on July 12. In terms of
changes in percent, the average IDDs per flight were increased by 1163% and 2618% for
Hub 2 and Hub 3, respectively. The average IADs per flight were increased by 3492%
and 6529% for Hub 2 and Hub 3, respectively. Because Hub 2 and Hub 3 had no PD on
July 8, the changes in percent are undefined.
Between the "high-delay" day and "low-delay" day, the differences in independent
delay and propagated delay of Airline B's three largest "hub" airports were on the
order of one hundred 6, much less than those of Airline A's two hubs. "Hub" 1 of Airline
B had an increase of 3.82 minutes for IDD per flight, 2.97 minutes for IAD per flight,
and 3.07 minutes for PD per flight on July 12. "Hub" 2 of Airline B had an increase of
4.95 minutes for IDD per flight, 11.2 minutes for IAD per flight, and 5.23 minutes for PD
per flight on July 12. "Hub" 3 of Airline B had a decrease of 0.78 minutes for IDD per
flight, a decrease of 0.91 minutes for IAD per flight, and an increase of 0.86 minutes for
PD per flight on July 12. In terms of changes in percent, the average IDDs per flight
were increased by 193% and 192% for "Hub" 1 and "Hub" 2, respectively. The average
6 except one instance of "Hub" 2 where the IAD per flight was increased by 1723%
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IDD per flight was decreased by 20% for "Hub" 3. The average IADs per flight were
increased by 372% and 1723% for "Hub" 1 and "Hub" 2, respectively. The averageIAD
per flight was decreased by 34% for "Hub" 2. The average PDs per flight were increased
by 170%, 228%, and 34% for "Hub" 1, "Hub" 2, and "Hub" 3, respectively.
The conclusion here is that between the "high-delay" day and "low-delay" day, the
increases in independent delay and propagated delay of Airline B's three largest "hub"
airports were much less than those of Airline A's two East Coast hubs.
Date 7/8/2006 7/12/2006 7/8/2006 7/12/2006 7/8/2006 7/12/2006
Average IDD 7.85 8.96 1.36 17.17 1.03 28
Average IAD 6.11 10.5 0.77 27.66 0.41 27.18
Average PD 0.64 1.24 0 15.57 0 6.31
Date 7/8/2006 7/12/2006 7/8/2006 7/12/2006 7/8/2006 7/12/2006
Average IDD 1.98 5.81 2.58 7.53 3.81 3.03
Average IAD 0.8 3.76 0.65 11.85 2.66 1.75
Average PD 1.81 4.88 2.29 7.52 2.51 3.37







AverageIDDAverage 1.11 14 15.81 1163 26.97 2618
IDD
AverageAverage 4.39 72 26.89 3492 26.77 6529
IAD
Average PD 0.60 94 15.57 N/A 6.31 N/A
Date Differences Change Differences Change Differences Change(min) % (min) % (min) %
Average 3.82 193 4.95 192 
-0.78 
-20IDD
Average 2.97 372 11.20 1723 
-0.91 
-34IAD
Average PD 3.07 170 5.23 228 0.86 34
Table 3-8: The changes in IDD, IAD, and PD per flight between July 8 and July 12 for both
airlines (in minutes and %)
Chapter 4
Passenger Demand and Delay Estimation
4.1 Literature Review
Using proprietary airline data, Barnhart and Bratu (2005) [3] developed a Passenger
Delay Calculator (PDC) to investigate the impact of delayed flights, cancelled flights
and missed connections on passenger trip time. They estimated that disrupted
passengers, those who missed one or more of their connections, due to delayed flights,
or with one or more of their flights cancelled, experienced an average delay that was
about 20 times greater than the average flight delay in that same period. Their research
quantified the gap between passenger delays and flight delays with real data, as well as
demonstrated that flight based metrics alone are a poor proxy for passenger delays in
hub-and-spoke airlines.
Ball, et al. (2005) [1] developed an analytical passenger delay model as part of the
National Aviation Space (NAS) Strategy Simulator. The model is based on a decision
tree which determines the probability of delayed flight leg, missed connection,
cancelled flight leg, and on-time flight leg. A major limitation of their work is that they
assume a fixed passenger delay (7 hours) for all the passengers experiencing missed
connections or flight cancellations. This assumption assumes a homogenous
transportation network and neglects airport and route specific characteristics.
Sherry and Wang (2007) [26] expanded Barnhart and Bratu's model to a national scale
study with detailed analysis on various O-D pairs, departure and arrival airports, as
well as load factor levels. Their model uses a large quantity of publicly accessible data
and provided rankings of O-D pairs, airports and other results in the measure of
passenger on-time performance. However, there are two major drawbacks in their
research:
1. The algorithm assumes flights in peak hours have the same load factor as flights
in non-peak hours and fails to use actual passenger enplanements and aircraft
size to validate this assumption.
2. Unlike the PDC, Sherry and Wang's analysis considers only non-stop segment
data and excludes the possibility of disruptions due to missed connections.
4.2 Contributions of Our Methodology
Our work uses the PDC algorithm to quantify passenger delays. However, one
limitation of Bratu and Barnhart's research is that the PDC depends on the availability
of detailed passenger booking data provided by airlines. In this research, we recognize
that itinerary information and airline booking data are not generally accessible and
therefore, we develop a method to determine passenger booking information for all
scheduled flights using only data available from the BTS. Our method consists of two
core parts:
* An algorithm that generates itineraries, and
* A linear integer programming formulation that computes the number of
passengers on each of the generated itineraries.
To address the heterogeneity in passenger demand or load factors for different days of a
week and different times of a day, we consider an airline's historical passenger booking
profile for July 2000. Although far from being an accurate source to draw passenger
demand profiles, this database serves our purpose of conducting a system-wide study
and provides us an approximation of air-travelers' behavior across different days of a
week and different times of a day for the major domestic markets.
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The outline for this chapter is as follows: we first illustrate how to generate itineraries
using the publicly accessible data from BTS; then, we discuss the linear integer
programming formulation that allocates the passengers to our generated itineraries;
last, we input the results of these steps to the PDC to compute passenger delay
statistics. Figure 4-1 illustrates the framework of our Itinerary Generation Algorithm
(IGA), Passenger Allocation Process (PAP), and Passenger Delay Calculator (PDC).
Figure 4-1: The framework of the Itinerary Generation Algorithm (IGA), Passenger Allocation
Process (PAP), and Passenger Delay Calculator (PDC)
4.3 Data Descriptions
We use the publicly accessible data described in Chapter 1.6 to generate itineraries and
allocate passengers so that "estimated" passenger booking information can be derived
and input to our PDC for computing passenger delay statistics. DB1B provides only
passenger route information (no flight schedule information) and ASQP provides only
flight information (no passenger information). The FAA Aircraft Registry Database is
used to obtain the flight seating capacity information, which is then applied to the PAP
and the disruption recovery process in the PDC. In addition to data described in
Chapter 1.6, an airline's historical passenger booking profile for July 2000 is also
included. It provides passenger booking and no-show information for July 2000. We use
this database to derive passenger demand profiles for different days of a week and
different times of a day, which are input to the PAP.
4.4 The 3-Stage Approach
The major difficulty in utilizing the passenger booking information from BTS is that
most of its data (such as DB1B) do not provide any schedule information but only route
or market information. This chapter provides a model to strengthen the linkage
between passenger booking information and flight schedules using public data. Given
an O-D market in DB1B of a certain quarter, we look into the ASQP data (e.g. a 90-day
span) in the same quarter and enumerate all possible flight combinations that serve this
O-D pair using MCT and MLT as selection rules. It is relatively simple to build
passenger itineraries by linking ASQP (detailed flight information) with DB1B
(aggregated passenger booking information). Our model includes an algorithm that
generates itineraries and a passenger allocation scheme that determines the passenger
flow on each itinerary for every airline under study.
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4.4.1 Itinerary Generation Algorithm (IGA)
Problem Description: Given a particular airline, construct its itineraries using publicly
accessible data such as DB1B and ASQP.
Assumptions: In the following development, our itineraries will contain no more than
two flight legs as the majority of domestic passengers make no more than two
connections. Moreover, we only consider itineraries within a single airline at a time; in
other words, itineraries operated by multiple airlines will not be generated. These
restrictions can be lifted and our approach is still applicable; they are in place only to
limit the number of itineraries generated that are likely to have no passengers.
Inputs to IGA include:
1) Aircraft routings (origin airports, connecting airports, if any, and destination
airports) from DB1B. We will refer to the routings as O-T-D (Origin-Transfer-
Destination) or O-A-D (Origin-Absence of Transfer-Destination) in the following
discussion for simplicity.
2) Planned flight schedules from ASQP:
a. PATi - Planned Arrival Time of flight i (available in ASQP data, Column
"CRSArrTime")
b. PDTj - Planned Departure Time of flight j (available in ASQP data,
Column "CRSDepTime")
3) User-Defined Parameters:
a. MLT- Maximum Layover Time
b. PRT - Passenger Ready Time
The steps of the IGA algorithm are illustrated below:
STEP 1: For each airline, identify the O-T-D airports served during a quarter from
DB1B. O-A-D is used to indicate a local itinerary route. For instance, ATL-IAH-EWR is a
connecting itinerary for the O-D pair ATL-EWR while ATL-A-EWR is a local itinerary
for the O-D pair ATL-EWR. The roundtrip indicators in DB1B Ticket are used to separate
coupons with round trips7 .
STEP 2: For each O-A-D or O-T-D identified in STEP 1, construct the corresponding
sequence of flight legs, or itineraries, from ASQP in a stepwise fashion, with the
itineraries for O-A-D pairs served by non-stop flights constructed first, and the
itineraries with two legs (O-T-D) constructed next. Discriminators such as Minimum
Connecting Time (MCT) and non-stop market frequency can be used to determine
whether a particular itinerary should be selected or not.
Itinerary Feasibility: Determining the feasibility of itineraries for each O-A-D or O-T-D
for each airline requires the following sequential algorithm:
= For each O-A-D,
The flight leg's departure and arrival airports in ASQP correspond to the
origin (0) and destination (D) airports in DB1B, respectively
= For each O-T-D,
The first flight leg's departure and arrival airports in ASQP correspond to
the origin (0) and connecting (T) airports in DB1B, respectively;
The second flight leg's departure and arrival airports in ASQP correspond
to the connecting (T) and destination (D) airports in DB1B, respectively;
The second flight leg departs later than the passenger ready time (PRT); that
is, the time between the arrival of the first flight leg and the departure of
7 Flight legs from an origin airport o to a destination airport d constitute a route, while the return flight
legs from d to o represent a different route, called the opposite route.
the second flight leg in the itinerary must be no less than MCT (Minimum
Connecting Time); and
The time between the arrival of the first flight leg and the departure of the
second flight leg in the itinerary must be no greater than MDT (Maximum
Layover Time).
Suppose flight i serves as the first leg and flight j serves as the second leg
PRT = PATi+ MCT : PDTi.
Thus, PATi + MCT will be used to select the second flight from ASQP in the IGA
algorithm. A typical value for MCT is 15 minutes. However, because different airports
require different connecting time, we set MCT based on the connecting airport. For
instance, Chicago O'Hare connecting passengers may need 25 minutes to make a
connection.
4.4.2 Passenger Allocation Process (PAP)
Problem Description: Given a particular airline, a particular day of the year, and a
vector of O-D based passenger demands (quarterly aggregated), estimate the number of
passengers transported on each itinerary. This requires allocating passenger flows to the
itineraries generated by IGA. DB1B, a 10% sample of airline tickets from reporting
carriers, provides counts of passengers transported on each O-D pair on a quarterly-
basis. From this, we get estimates of the total number of passengers transported on an
O-A-D or O-T-D itinerary daily, and then allocate these passengers to itineraries
throughout the day using the T-100 information and passenger booking profiles. The T-
100 segment database with its count of passengers transported on each non-stop flight
segment on a monthly-basis is to constrain passenger allocations to match those
observed in actuality.
Researchers have tried different approaches to tackle this problem. A typical way is to
apply discrete choice models and quantify passengers' travel preferences, referred to as
itinerary choice problems (Coldren et al. (2003) [12]). We develop a linear integer
programming formulation to solve this problem. To the best of our knowledge, this has
never been done by others. The basic idea is to minimize the deviation of estimated
passenger flows and actual passenger flows subject to a set of flow constraints and a
flight seating capacity constraint. This optimization-based approach has a major
advantage in handling quantitative constraints associated with highly aggregated data,
such as BTS data. Additionally, compared to most itinerary choice models, an
optimization approach does not have to work at the level of individual observations
and consequently, circumvents many data issues relevant to choice models. We
describe the constraints, right-hand-side (RHS) parameters, and objective function in
the following.
Notations
I: the set of itineraries generated by the IGA
R: the set of routes in DB1B
F: the set of operated flights in ASQP
S: the set of non-stop segments in T-100 segment data8
M: the set of O-D markets
P: the set of periods
8 An element of S is the set of operated flights with the same origin and destination in F.
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Constraint Set 1: the flight seating capacity constraints. The seating capacity for each flight
in the airline's network can be derived using the following procedures:
a) Obtain the tail number of each of the airline's flights in ASQP and match the
aircraft tail number to its aircraft type using the FAA Aircraft registry database
[15].
b) After identifying aircraft types, obtain from the target airline's official website
the seating capacity, denoted by T, for each flightf.
The PAP should assign passengers to itineraries in the way such that the flight seating
capacity is never exceeded by the passenger flow on a plane.
Constraint Set 2: the route passenger flow constraints. A route can be either a local or
connecting route. The right-hand-side (RHS) parameters are target values that we
estimate from DB1B market data for a particular day d, and the particular airline, using
the following procedures:
a) Aggregate the number of passenger bookings for the airline over coupons (DB1B
Coupon) with the same O-T-D or O-A-D airports to obtain quarterly route
passenger flow.
b) Obtain the percentage of annual passengers transported (by airline) for the
month in which day d falls, using BTS data (2006) [4]. Divide this percentage by
the sum of the percentages corresponding to the three months in the quarter
containing day d.
c) Compute the relevant monthly route passenger flow by multiplying a) and b)
and, to obtain the weekly average route passenger flow, divide this value by the
number of weeks in that month.
d) Derive a weekly passenger demand profile, represented by the percentage of
booked passengers that travel on each day of the week over a week, using an
airline's actual historical passenger booking data. Multiply c) by the percentage
corresponding to day d to obtain the daily route passenger flow for d, denoted by
TR.
The intuition behind the route passenger flow constraints is that passenger demand for
an O-D route varies by day. Although procedure d) assumes different airlines have
similar weekly passenger demand profiles, constraint set 1 enforces the assignment of
passengers to match the daily seating capacity provided by the airline and the other
constraint sets 2, 3 and 4, work to ensure that the assignment of passengers mimics the
T-100 segment data.
Constraint Set 3: the segment passenger flow constraints. The total flow on a flight
segment consists of local and/or connecting passengers. For example, assume the flight
segment A-B has 100 passengers: 50 of these passengers connect at B and continue
flying; the other 50 passengers, who might have connected or originated at A, have their
final destination at B. The total number of passengers on a segment, that is the RHS
target values, is derived from T-100 Segment data, using the following procedures:
a) Aggregate the number of transported passengers of the airline over its non-stop
segments (T-100 Segment) with the same O-D airports to obtain the monthly
segment passenger flow.
b) To obtain the weekly average segment passenger flow, we divide a) by the
number of weeks in the month of day d.
c) Using the weekly passenger demand profile (i.e., a typical share of booked
passengers on each day of a week) computed for constraint set 2, multiply the
share on day d by b) to obtain the daily segment passenger flow, denoted by Ts.
Similar to the route passenger flow constraints, the segment passenger flow constraints
are to match, as closely as possible, the assignment of passengers and the actual
passenger demand on each segment s, estimated as Ts.
Constraint Set 4: the period passenger flow constraints. The RHS parameters represent the
airline's passenger flow in each market, commencing in each period. A market is
defined to be any O-D pair between which passengers travel. The RHS passenger flow
parameters are derived from DB1B and an airline's historical data, using the following
procedures:
a) Aggregate the number of passenger bookings for the airline over coupons (DB1B
Coupon) in the same market to obtain quarterly market passenger flow.
b) Obtain the percentage of annual passengers transported (by airline) for the
month in which day d falls, using BTS data (2006) [4]. Divide this percentage by
the sum of the percentages corresponding to the three months in the quarter
containing day d.
c) Compute the monthly market passenger flow for the airline by multiplying a)
and b). To obtain the weekly average market passenger flow, divide the monthly
flow by the number of weeks in that month.
d) Derive the weekly passenger demand profile (i.e., a typical share of booked
passengers on each day of a week) using an airline's actual historical passenger
booking data.
e) Multiply c) by d) to obtain the airline's daily market passenger flow for the
particular day under investigation.
f) Derive a "time of day" passenger demand profile (i.e., the share of booked
passengers for each non-overlapping, pre-defined period in a day) using an
airline's historical passenger booking data. For our work, we define three
periods: 0600-1200 (morning), 1200-1800 (afternoon), and 1800-2400 (evening).
g) Multiply e) by f) to obtain the market passenger flow for each period of a day. In
other words, the period passenger flow is the product of the total passengers in a
given market m on a particular day and the fraction of passengers in that market
during period p. TMP denotes period p passenger flow in market m.
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When applying the above procedures, we find that connecting markets and local
markets have different "time of day" passenger demand profiles (in other words, local
and connecting passengers show different travel behavior).
The intuition behind the period passenger flow constraints is that passenger demand
varies by time of day and different markets are likely to have different passenger
demand profiles. For example, demand for a business market may peak at a different
time of day compared to that of a leisure market. To approximate better the number of
passenger bookings on each itinerary, we include these time-of-day considerations in
our PAP.
The objective function attempts to minimize the sum of all slack or surplus variables,
normalized by the corresponding target values (RHS parameters), i.e., the total
deviation of all constraints. w's represent the "weights" ,where wrslack = Wrsurplus = 0.5,
Wsegslack = Wsgsurplus= 0.5, Wschslack = Wsh_surplus = 0.3, and wseat = 0.5. The weights reflect
how close we want the left hand side values to match the right hand side parameters.
Because the RHS of constraint set 4 is derived from an airline's historical passenger
booking profile for July 2000, which has less accuracy than the other parameters, we
assign a smaller weight to its corresponding slack and surplus variables in the objective
function. The final weights are chosen based on a trial-and-error process.
The Optimization Model
Decision Variables9
Xi e Z : number of passengers assigned to itinerary i, where i E I
Route slackr e Z*: slack variable for each route constraint r, where r E R
Route_surplusre Z*: surplus variable for each route constraint r, where r E R
Segslacks e Z+: a non-negative slack variable for each segment constraint s, where s E S
Seg_surpluss e Z+: a non-negative surplus variable for each segment constraint s
Period_slackmp E Ze: a non-negative slack variable for each period constraint mp, where m
E M, p E P, and mp E M X P (the cartesian product of M and P indicating market m
during period p)
Periodsurplusmp a Z*: a non-negative surplus variable for each period constraint mp,
where mp is defined the same as above
Indicator Parameters
1. & = 1 if itinerary i corresponds to route r; 0 otherwise
2. qis = 1 if itinerary i contains segment s10; 0 otherwise
3. Ai = 1 if itinerary i is served by flightf; 0 otherwise
4. 7i,mp = 1 if itinerary i serves market m and departs in period p; 0 otherwise
5. 7r= 1 if route r is a connecting route; 0 otherwise
9 We solve the optimization problem for each airline and each day. For simplicity, the target values for
that day are denoted without the index indicating the day. We also drop the index denoting the airline.
10 Note a segment corresponds to the set of non-stop flights throughout the day with a given origin and
destination.
Constraints"
(1) iI Aifxi <- Tf V f E F;
(2) CieI irXi + Route_slackr - Route_surplusr = Tr V r E R;
(3) LZeI isXi + Seg_slacks - Seg_surpluss = Ts V s E S;
(4) XiEl 1ri,mpxi + Period_slackmp - Period_surplusmp = Tmp V m E M and p E P.
Objective Function
Minimize: Wr slackRoute slackr Wr surplusRoutesurplusr- + -
Tr Tr
rER
+ ( W s  +Wge gs a ck  s l a c k s  segsurplusSegsurplUSs
SES
+- E ( -mp slackPeriod slackmp WmpsurplusPeriod surplusmp
pEP mEM mp mp
We solve this optimization problem with CPLEX on OPL 5.0. The outputs include the
number of passengers assigned to each itinerary generated in IAG, that is, an estimation
of passenger booking information. These outputs are combined with the flight
schedules from ASQP and input into the PDC to compute passenger delay statistics.
11 Because the left hand side of the constraints is an integer matrix with linearly independent rows and the
right hand side is an integer vector, by Unimodularity Theorem, there exists an integer optimal solution
to the linear program version of this problem. Therefore, even though the problem is formulated as a
linear integer program, it can be solved to optimality by its linear relaxation.
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4.4.3 Passenger Delay Calculator (PDC)
Most of the following discussions are based upon the work of Stephane Bratu (2005) [3],
who originally developed the PDC algorithm.
Definition of Disruptions. The core of PDC is to distinguish between disrupted and
non-disrupted passengers, as well as to recover the disrupted passengers. As defined
earlier, a passenger is disrupted if:
* One or more of the flights in his/her scheduled itinerary is canceled; or
* The passenger misses connections.
Consequently, disrupted passengers must be re-accommodated on alternative
itineraries, while non-disrupted passengers have the same scheduled and actual
itineraries. Because scheduled and actual itineraries are different for disrupted
passengers, the set of passengers P can be divided into two mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive subsets: D and ND, corresponding to the set of disrupted and
non-disrupted passengers, respectively. We denote the queue of passengers to be re-
accommodated by the airline at time t as DQ(t) and let DT(p) be the time of disruption
for passenger p. Let d(p) be the Passenger Arrival Delay for p, computed as the maximum
of zero and the difference between p's actual arrival time and scheduled arrival time.
Hence, d(p) = max(AAT(L(p)) - PAT(L(p)); 0), where L(p) denotes the last flight in p's
actual itinerary, (AI(p)).
PDC Assumptions. PDC provides only approximate delay estimates. The assumptions
underlying our PDC are likely to lead to underestimates of actual passenger delays. We
present them in the following:
a. Perfect information: we assume at any point in time that future operations are
known exactly. Consequently, disrupted passengers, once they are assigned to
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recovery itineraries, cannot be disrupted again. Additionally, we assume in PDC
that the airline has perfect knowledge of the number of seats available for each
flight. In reality, airlines do not have this information, as some passengers might
not show-up for their flights, especially business passengers who sometimes
have fully refundable tickets.
b. Instantaneous information: we assume that a disrupted passenger is
instantaneously rebooked on the best feasible recovery itinerary, that is, the one
which arrives earliest at the disrupted passenger's destination, has an available
seat, and has at least the minimum connect time between the passenger
disruption time and the departure of the first flight in the recovery itinerary.
Regarding service priorities, based on current industry practices and available
information, we have made the following assumptions:
c. Booking priority: Consistent with industry practice, non-disrupted passengers
have priority over disrupted passengers. Therefore, non-disrupted passengers
are not reassigned to an itinerary different from their scheduled itinerary.
d. No bumped passengers: We assume all non-disrupted passengers fly their
booked itineraries, with passenger bumping not allowed.
e. Rebooking order: Disrupted passengers are re-accommodated under a First-
Disrupted-First-Recovered (FDFR) policy. When a flight is canceled, the order in
which disrupted passengers are re-accommodated depends on the disrupted
passengers' check-in times. Because we do not know this information, we rank
the disrupted passengers randomly in our disruption queue.
f. Time passengers are informed about flight schedule disruptions: We do not have
information pertaining to the time at which passengers are informed that their
schedules are disrupted. We have, therefore, assumed that passengers disrupted
by a canceled flight are notified when the flight is scheduled to depart.
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g. Passengers re-accommodated on the next-day's flights or on other airlines'
flights: In PDC, there are two situations where disrupted passengers are
recovered by other airlines:
* Situation 1: For some disrupted passengers, if the airline has only one fight
per day for certain routes (between the disrupted airports and their final
destination), these groups are assumed to be recovered either the next day
or by other airlines on the same day. If these passengers are disrupted
before 6pm, we assume they are recovered by other airlines; otherwise,
they must wait to be re-accommodated on the next day's flight.
* Situation 2: If a passenger delay exceeds the predefined Maximum
Passenger Delay (MPD) threshold (of 15 hours, see Bratu, 2003, for analysis
supporting this selection), then he/she is re-accommodated on a different
airline. In effect, this limit serves as a crude model of inter-airline
passenger re-accommodation. To be more accurate in estimating the
resulting delay to these passengers, information regarding seat
availabilities on other airlines and airline policies are required.
h. Passenger Minimum Connection Time: Passengers require at least the MCT to
transfer to their outgoing flights. Although MCT varies for each connecting
passenger at each airport because of differences in the distances between gates
and disembarking times, we set MCT to 15 minutes.
i. No Luggage Disruption: Although checked-in luggage is another important
dimension of passenger service, we do not consider luggage disruption in our
analysis.
PDC Algorithm. Inputs to the PDC include: (1) flight schedules with given aircraft
routings; (2) itineraries generated by the IGA; (3) for each scheduled itinerary, the
number of booked passengers (that is, the outputs from the PAP); and (4) the planned
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and actual flight departure time, arrival time, departure delay and arrival delay for each
flight in the schedule as well as each canceled and diverted flight (from ASQP). The
steps of the PDC algorithm are illustrated in Figure 4-2. In STEP 1, for all flights in the
schedule, we determine which itinerary is disrupted. The recovery queue is built in
STEP 2, according to our specified recovery policy. In STEP 3, each disrupted passenger
is re-accommodated on a feasible itinerary that arrives as early as possible at the desired
destination or on a different airline (sees Assumption g). In STEP 4, disrupted
passengers, for whom there is no efficient recovery itinerary within a specified time
frame, are assumed to be recovered on different airlines. In STEP 5, passenger delay
estimations are aggregated and passenger schedule reliability statistics are computed.
F:ight delcys ond flight concellotions Paswenger
bookings for each schedule d itinerary
STEP I
------------r___r L~ll~_____-- ------------------------
STEP 2 Buoilod the queue ofn
disrvupted ,s, . O-senCgers, DQ Agn a non pted passen
to th zir scheduied itineraries
Sort DQ accordin to service poticy Remove seats from remoinring inventory
Record possenger deay
STEP 3 Take next disrupted passenger in. DO
- -- -- - .
Find best recovery iine rary ond assign paosNe:rg~ IS} .."VD?
Remove seat from remaining inventory S Yes TEP 4
Record pa senger delay
Figure 4-2: Passenger Delay Calculator schematic
Details of the steps of PDC are as follows:
D STEP 1: Identifying disrupted and non-disrupted itineraries.
If a passenger schedule is disrupted, the airline will search for a recovery itinerary to re-
accommodate the disrupted passenger. A recovery itinerary is defined as a sequence of
flights with at least one seat available on each flight to re-accommodate a disrupted
passenger to his/her desired destination. For each passenger p on an itinerary
containing, for example, flights f(1) followed by f(2), Figure 4-3 illustrates the sequential




4 If yes, passenger p is disrupted, p E D and disruption time DT(p) = PDT(f(l))
*. Else is f(2) cancelled?
E4 If yes, passenger p is disrupted, p E D and disruption time DT(p) = PDT(f(2))
o Else, is ADT(f(2)) - AAT(f(1)) < MCT?
4 If yes, passenger p is disrupted, p E D and disruption time DT(p) =
ADT(f(2))
o Otherwise, passenger p is not disrupted, p E ND, and arrival time is
AAT(f(2)), and d(p) = Max(O; AAT(f(2)) - PAT(f(2))).
Figure 4-3: Passenger disruption checking algorithm
Given the partitioning of passengers into the disrupted passenger subset D and the non-
disrupted passenger subset ND, the algorithm reserves seats first for each non-
disrupted passenger, as it is industry practice to give them priority over disrupted
passengers (as discussed in the service priority assumptions). Then, delay statistics for
non-disrupted passengers are recorded and available seat inventories are decremented
to reflect their assignments.
O STEP 2: Ordering the disrupted passengers.
The second step of PDC is to build the queue of disrupted passengers. Various service
policies are possible, including: (1) re-accommodating passengers in the order in which
they are disrupted, called First-Disrupted-First-Recovered (FDFR); (2) re-
accommodating passengers in the order of decreasing fare class value; or (3) re-
accommodating passengers in the order of decreasing frequent flyer status. In this
analysis, we sort the disrupted passengers in D according to the first policy because
detailed information on fare class value and frequent flyer status are not available.
When two different passengers are disrupted at the same time, we randomly select
whom to re-accommodate first.
O STEP 3: Re-accommodating disrupted passengers.
For each passenger, the PDC algorithm finds the recovery itinerary commencing at the
airport where the passenger is located and arriving the earliest to the passenger's
desired destination. Two lists of recovery itineraries for disrupted passenger p are
generated: the Direct Itinerary List (DIL(p)) for which itineraries have one flight leg only,
and the Connecting Itinerary List, CIL(p,H), for which itineraries have multiple flight legs
and connect through hub airport H. Once DIL(p) and CIL(p,H) are constructed for each
hub airport, the combined list is sorted according to arrival time and passenger p is re-
assigned to the earliest arriving itinerary with seat availability. For details of the
recovery itinerary search algorithm, refer to Bratu and Barnhart (2005) [3].
O STEP 4: Generating outputs.
The output of the PDC algorithm is a vector of passenger delay statistics, including
average delays for each passenger, and numbers of passengers in different groups, such
as local, connecting, disrupted, non-disrupted, disrupted and recovered on the same




In this chapter, we compare passenger delay statistics between the legacy network
carrier and the low-cost carrier on the two different days. As mentioned in Chapter 3,
passenger delays arise from flight delays and cancellations. Additionally, other factors
such as network structures, passenger mix, load factors, and flight schedule design, also
have a significant impact on passenger on-time performance. This chapter aims to
establish relationships between passenger delays and flight leg delays, cancellation
rates, load factors, network structures, passenger mix, and schedule design. In the next
section, we compare the network structures and passenger mixes of Airline A and
Airline B. We also discuss how flight schedules differ between the two airlines and
present a load factor analysis. We then show the differences in passenger delay and
disruption activities of the two airlines. Explanations of these differences are provided.
5.2 Network Structure and Passenger Mix
Airline A operates a "hub-and-spoke" network, while Airline B operates more of a
"point-to-point" network, although many connecting opportunities are provided at
"hub" networks. In this section, we compare the network operations and passenger mix
(local and connecting) of Airline A and Airline B. We first identify the three largest
airports (in terms of total enplaned passengers) at which each airline operates (Figure 5-
1) using data provided by BTS [4]. Then, for each major airport of the two airlines, we
compute the number of aircraft operations and connecting passengers in each one-hour
time window. Along the "time-window" axis, "1" represents 4:00am - 4:59am, "2"
represents 5:00am - 5:59am, and so on. The last label "20" represents 11:00pm -
11:59pm. Between 0:00am and 3:59am, neither Airline A nor Airline B operates domestic
flights.
The analysis of passenger mix (local vs. connecting) by airport (Figure 5-2 to Figure 5-7)
provides us useful insights into the airlines' passenger operations. For Airline A and
Airline B, the percentages of connecting passengers at their respective major airports are
comparable. Like Airline A, Airline B also exhibits a "hub" operation at its three largest
"hubs" (indicated by the high percentages of connecting passengers). However, there is
a difference in the level of connecting passenger traffic between the major airports of
Airline A and Airline B. In particular, the major hubs of Airline A accommodate a larger
share of A's connecting passenger traffic compared to the share of B's connecting
passengers captured at the major airports of Airline B. In other words, connecting
passengers are distributed more evenly in Airline B's system and hence, the shares of
connecting passengers in Airline B's major airports are not as significant as Airline A's.
In Figure 5-8 to Figure 5-10, we show airports with fewer operations and smaller
percentages of connecting passengers compared to the three largest "hubs" in Airline
B's operation. This suggests that in B's system, some airports act like "connecting hubs"
with higher percentages of connecting passenger traffic than at other airports in B's
network; airports which accommodate more local passengers. Strictly speaking, "point-
to-point" service is an inaccurate description of our low-cost carrier's network
operations. Rather, Airline B uses "hubs" to serve various levels of connecting
passenger traffic in the network. Further evidence to support this finding is that our
estimates show that an overall connecting share for the legacy carrier (the low-cost
carrier) of 35% (48%), and a local passenger share of 65% (52%).
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Figure 5-1: Market share in Airline A's (left) and Airline B's (right) total enplaned passengers 12
12 Enplaned passengers: the total number of revenue passengers boarding aircraft
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Figure 5-2: Scheduled flight operations (left) and percentage of connecting passengers (right) in
each one-hour time window at Hub 1
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Figure 5-3: Scheduled flight operations (left) and percentage of connecting passengers (right) in
each one-hour time window at Hub 2
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Figure 5-4: Scheduled flight operations (left) and percentage of connecting passengers (right) in
each one-hour time window at Hub 3
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Figure 5-5: Scheduled flight operations (left) and percentage of connecting passengers (right) in
each one-hour time window at "Hub" 1
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Figure 5-6: Scheduled flight operations (left) and percentage of connecting passengers (right) in
each one-hour time window at "Hub" 2
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Figure 5-7: Scheduled flight operations (left) and percentage of connecting passengers (right) in
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Figure 5-8: Scheduled flight operations (left) and percentage of connecting passengers (right) in
each one-hour time window at Secondary Airport 1
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Figure 5-9: Scheduled flight operations (left) and percentage of connecting passengers (right) in
each one-hour time window at Secondary Airport 2
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(Airline B 07/08/2006)




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Time Window
Figure 5-10: Scheduled flight operations (left) and percentage of connecting passengers (right)
in each one-hour time window at Secondary Airport 3
Peaked Schedules vs. De-peaked Schedules
Figure 5-2 (left) and Figure 5-4 (left) depict the number of flight operations for each one-
hour window at two major hubs of Airline A. As illustrated by the figures, these two
schedules create departure peaks at the hub with each peak planned to last about one to
two hours. Airline A operates one de-peaked hub (Figure 5-3), while, as shown in
Figures 5-5, 5-6, and 5-7, Airline B has de-peaked schedules at its three largest "hubs".
In a de-peaked schedule, aircraft need not wait on the ground for connecting passengers
and therefore ground turn times are reduced, leading to increased aircraft utilization.
This is evidenced by Table 5-1, which displays the daily utilization per aircraft of
Airline A and Airline B from 2005 to 2007, respectively. For both block hours and
airborne hours, Airline B achieved a higher utilization per aircraft than did Airline A.
Note that the numbers of departures performed by Airline B are almost twice as many
as those performed by Airline A, indicating (with the airborne hours information) that
Airline B flies shorter flights on average.
Daily utilization per 2005 2006 2007
aircraft (Airline A) ..............
Block hours 9.08 9.57 10.07
Airborne hours 7.46 7.8 8.2
Dep artures 3.3 3.47 3.65
Daily utilization per 2005 2006 2
aircraft (Airline B)
Block hours 11.13 11.22 11.19
Airborne hours 9.58 9.68 9.59
Departures 6.53 6.49 6.37
Table 5-1: Daily utilization per aircraft for Airline A (top)
Source: MIT Airline Data Project
and Airline B (bottom)
De-peaked schedules are more robust in the sense that airport capacity reductions
resulting from weather can have less of an impact than in the case of peaked operations
with their high-levels of peak demand for capacity.
5.3 Load Factors
Using information from T-100 Segment data (BTS (2006) [10]), we compute average load
factors per flight leg of the two airlines in July, 2006. Airline A had an average load
factor of 83.43% per flight leg and Airline B had 77.23%. Using the PAP method
developed in Chapter 4, we estimate the average load factor to be 79.20% (78.00%) for
Airline A and 81.20% (74.30%) for Airline B on the two days under consideration. With
our PAP, we find that Airline B transported 4.4 times more passengers on its domestic
flights than Airline A on non-week days like July 8 and 3.2 times more passengers on
week days like July 12. The numbers of passengers we estimate are 60.2k (86.4k) for
Airline A and 262.8k (278.0k) for Airline B on July 8 (July 12). In Figure 5-11, we plot the
percent of flight legs with load factors greater than or equal to selected values, for both
airlines in July 2006. The vertical gap between the two curves represents the difference
in the percentage of flight legs with load factors greater than or equal to a fixed value.
According to these plots, we find:
* 58.58% of Airline A's flights had a load factor greater than or equal to 85%
compared to only 33.72% for Airline B;
* 40.05% of Airline A's flights had a load factor greater than or equal to 90%
compared to only 21.14% for Airline B;
* 15.71% of Airline A's flights had a load factor greater than or equal to 95%
compared to only 7.34% for Airline B;
* 2.39% of Airline A's flights had all seats sold out compared to only 1.60% for
Airline B.
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Figure 5-11: Percent of flight legs with load factor greater than or equal to various levels in July,
2006
5.4 Passenger Delay Statistics
As in Chapter 3, our analysis applies only to jet-operated flight legs because the ASQP
data set includes only jet operated flight leg information. Using the 3-stage approach
described in Chapter 4, we compute the passenger delay statistics for the two airlines on
July 8 and July 12, 2006 (shown in Table 5-2). Flight delay statistics from Chapter 3 are
retained in Table 5-2 to assist our understanding of differences in the airlines' passenger
delays. In Table 5-3 (Table 5-4), we display the differences (ratios) between statistics of
the two airlines and between statistics of the two days for the same airline.
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* Delayed flights (delayed passengers) are the flights (passengers) with delays
Table 5-2: Passenger and flight delay statistics
greater than 15 minutes
727 2698 922 3116
60.2 262.8 86.4 278.0
79.20% 81.20% 78.00% 74.30%
87.60% 89.00% 60.60% 75.80%
12.40% 11.00% 39.40% 24.20%
0 0.44% 1.52% 0.89%
6.36 4.82 38.75 12.28
19.36 17.5 67.16 25.74
8.11 8.74 53.84 21.28
13.63% 14.79% 43.49% 36.77%
0.40% 0.44% 2.80% 1.25%
7.31 5.03 41.48 14.23
185 105 457 230
261.76 409.39 482.99 578.25
25.78 26.47 84.97 44.07
1.28 1.81 1.38 1.73
1.15 1.04 1.07 1.16
41.16 84.94 12.46 47.09
1.75 3.92 15.09 9
0.95 0.21 2.73 1.95
255.4 404.57 444.24 565.97
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*A8-B8: The differences between statistics of Airline A on
**A12-B12: The differences between statistics of Airline A
***A12-A8: The differences between statistics of Airline A
****B12-B8: The differences between statistics of Airline B
July 8 and statistics of Airline B on July 8
on July 12 and statistics of Airline B on July 12
on July 12 and statistics of Airline A on July 8
on July 12 and statistics of Airline B on July 8
Table 5-3: Absolute differences in passenger and flight delay statistics
:::.-
I A8-B8* A12-B12** A12-A8*** B12-B8****
2. Number of onboard passengers0 0.23 0.31 1.44 1.06
3. Average load factor per flight leg 0.98 1.05 0.98 0.92
4.15 minutes on time performance 0.69 0.850.98 0.8 0.69 0.85(15-OTP)
5. Percentage of delayed flights 3.18 2.181.13 1.63 3.18 2.18
(only flights operated)
6. Percentage of cancelled flights 0 1.71 NA 2.02
7. Average delay of operated flights 1.32 3.16 6.09 2.55i iiiiiiii i~i ii 3 1 0
(minutes)
8. Average delay of flights with delays 1.11 2.61 3.47 1.47
(minutes)
i~tl ~ ~8 ..0.93 2.53 6.64 2.43
10. Percentage of delayed passengers 0.92 1.18 3.19 2.49
11. Percentage of disrupted passengers 0.91 2.24 7 2.84
12. Average delay of non-disrupted 1.45 2.91 5.67 2.831.45 2.91 5.67 2.83
eassen ers (minutes)
13. Maximum delay of non-disrupted 1.76 1.991.76 1.99 2.47 2.19
passengers (minutes)
14. Average delay of disrupted 0.64 0.84
i i-i 0.97 1.93 3.3 1.66
9 to 7 0.71 0.80 1.08 0.96
12 to 7 1.11 0.92 0.93 1.12
14 to 7 0.48 0.26 0.30 0.55
*A8/B8: The ratios of statistics of Airline A on July 8 to statistics of Airline B on July 8
**A12/B12: The ratios of statistics of Airline A on July 12 to statistics of Airline B on July 12
***A12/A8: The ratios of statistics of Airline A on July 12 to statistics of Airline A on July 8
****B12/B8: The ratios of statistics of Airline B on July 12 to statistics of Airline B on July 8
Table 5-4: Ratios in passenger and flight delay statistics
1.27 1.150.27 0.3
From the tables above, several observations are made for July 8, 2006 in terms of
passenger delays and disruptions:
1. The maximum delay of non-disrupted passengers for Airline A was 1.76 times
greater than that for Airline B.
2. Airline B's non-disrupted passengers experienced less delay than Airline A's.
Notice that Airline A's operated flights experienced an average delay of 6.36
minutes while Airline B's operated flights experienced an average of 4.82
minutes. Additionally, the percentage of Airline A's delayed flights (12.40%) was
higher than that of Airline B's delayed fights (11.0%). These differences resulted
in a higher average delay for Airline A's non-disrupted passengers.
3. The overall percentages of disrupted passengers were comparable for both
airlines with Airline B having a slightly higher percentage.
4. All passenger disruptions of Airline A were due to missed connections because
there were no flight cancellations. On the other hand, passenger disruptions of
Airline B arose from a mix of cancelled flights and missed connections.
5. Airline B had a higher load factor than Airline A.
6. Airline B's disrupted passengers experienced 1.56 times more average delay than
Airline A's disrupted passengers. The fact that Airline A had no flight
cancellations and lower average load factors explains in part why Airline B's
disrupted passengers had a higher average delay than Airline A's. When a
disruption is caused by a flight cancellation rather than a missed connection, the
cancellation causes all passengers on the flight to compete for seats. In contrast, a
delayed rather than cancelled flight results in fewer missed connections to a
given flight, which makes the recovery process easier. Additionally, the
frequency of markets served by each airline also affects its disrupted passenger
delay in the sense that higher market frequency translates into a quicker recovery
when disruptions occur.
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7. Overall, the average delay of all passengers (disrupted and non-disrupted) and
the average delay of passengers with positive delays were slightly higher for
Airline B than for Airline A.
8. The percentage of delayed passengers was slightly higher for Airline B than for
Airline A.
9. The ratio of overall passenger delay to operated flight delay was higher for
Airline B than for Airline A.
10. The ratios of non-disrupted passenger delay to operated flight delay were
comparable for both airlines.
11. The ratio of disrupted passenger delay to operated flight delay for Airline B was
twice as much as that for Airline A.
For July 12, 2006, the following observations are made from the tables above, regarding
passenger delays and disruptions:
1. On average, Airline A had a higher load factor (78.00%) than Airline B (74.30%)
per flight leg.
2. Airline A had 1.71 times more cancellations than Airline B. In contrast to July 8,
2006, Airline B's cancellations doubled and Airline A's cancellations increased
from none to a significant number (1.52% of flights were cancelled).
3. The maximum delay of non-disrupted passengers for Airline A was twice as
much as that for Airline B.
4. The average delay of non-disrupted passengers for Airline A was three times as
much as that for Airline B. Notice that the average delay of Airline A's operated
flights was 3.16 times higher than that of Airline B's operated flights.
Additionally, the percentage of Airline A's delayed flights (39.40%) was higher
than that of Airline B's delayed flights (24.20%). For flights with positive delays,
the average delay for Airline A was 2.61 times higher than that for Airline B.
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These differences resulted in a higher average delay for Airline A's non-
disrupted passengers.
5. In contrast to July 8, 2006, the overall percentage of disrupted passengers was
increased by a factor of 7 for Airline A and a factor of 2.84 for Airline B.
6. The overall percentage of disrupted passengers for Airline A was 2.24 times
more than that for Airline B.
7. Airline B's disrupted passengers experienced 1.20 times more delay on average
than Airline A's.
8. Overall, the average delay of all passengers (disrupted and non-disrupted) for
Airline A was 2.5 times higher than for Airline B.
9. The average delay of passengers with positive delays was 1.93 times higher for
Airline A than for Airline B. The percentage of delayed passengers was also
higher for Airline A than for Airline B.
10. The ratio of overall passenger delay (and non-disrupted passenger delay) to
operated flight delay was higher for Airline B than for Airline A.
11. The ratio of disrupted passenger delay to operated flight delay for Airline B was
almost four times as much as that for Airline A.
Compared to July 8, 2006 (the "low-delay" day), passenger on-time performances were
worse for both airlines on July 12, 2006 (the "high-delay" day). This is also true in terms
of both airlines' flight on-time performance. In particular, compared to July 8, 2006, the
average delay of operated flights was increased by a factor of 6.09 for Airline A and a
factor of 2.55 for Airline B. The average delay of flights with positive delays was
increased by a factor of 3.47 for Airline A and a factor of 1.47 for Airline B. Also, the
percentage of delayed flights was increased by a factor of 3.18 for Airline A and 2.18 for
Airline B. In particular, we observe:
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1. The percentage of delayed passengers was increased by a factor of 3.19 for
Airline A and 2.49 for Airline B.
2. The overall percentage of disrupted passengers was increased by a factor of 7 for
Airline A and a factor of 2.84 for Airline B on July 12, 2006.
3. The maximum delay of non-disrupted passengers was increased by a factor of
2.47 for Airline A and a factor of 2.19 for Airline B.
4. The average delay of all passengers was increased by a factor of 6.64 for Airline
A and a factor of 2.43 for Airline B.
5. The average delay of passengers with positive delays was increased by a factor of
3.30 for Airline A and a factor of 1.66 for Airline B.
Summary of the Delay Statistics
For each airline, the average delay of its operated flights and the average delay of its
non-disrupted passengers were comparable on the two days. However, the
discrepancies between delay of operated flights and average delay of all passengers
were increased for both airlines on the "high-delay" day. This is because the overall
percentages of disrupted passengers were increased significantly for both airlines on
July 12, 2006. This result confirms findings from previous studies (Bratu and Barnhart
(2005) [3], Wang et al. (2007) [25]) that simple flight-based statistics tend to
underestimate passenger delays on a "high disruption" day because disrupted
passengers experience longer delays on average than do flights.
Highlight Finding 1 - Differences in Aircraft and Passenger Delay between Airline A
and Airline B on the "High-Delay" Day
One of the key observations from Table 5-2 is that although both airlines had "high-
delay" in flight operations on July 12, Airline A suffered almost three times as much
aircraft delay and 2.5 times as much passenger delay in absolute minutes as Airline B.
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In Chapter 3.2.2, we find that on July 12, 2006, Airline A had 13% of flights experiencing
delay propagation and Airline B had 18.7%. However, Airline A suffers twice as much
propagated delay (12.48 minutes) on average as Airline B (6.19 minutes). Airline B, then,
had a higher percentage of flights with propagated delay than Airline A but
experienced much less passenger delay. We believe the fact that Airline B had a higher
percentage of flights with propagated delay (than Airline A did) lies in an important
difference between Airline A and Airline B in how they build their schedules; i.e.,
Airline B plans less turn time slack (than Airline A does). Additionally, Airline B can
afford to schedule its turn time with less slack and on "high-delay" days let delay
propagate with fewer passengers being disrupted because Airline B plans longer
connection times for its passengers than Airline A does. Our analysis shows that the
average passenger connecting time for Airline A's passengers was 97.87 (99.41) minutes
compared to 134.65 (135.29) minutes for Airline B on July 8 (July 12), 2006.
Highlight Finding 2 - Discrepancy between Various Delay Measures
One interesting finding is that on both days, the ratios of passenger delay to operated
flight delay for Airline B were higher than the corresponding values for Airline A. This
difference is most obvious in terms of the ratio of disrupted passenger delay to operated
flight delay, although on the "high-delay" day, the percentage of disrupted passengers
was much higher for Airline A than for Airline B. In particular, the following
observations are made:
* On July 8 (July 12), the ratio of overall passenger delay to operated flight delay
was 1.81 (1.73) for Airline B and 1.28 (1.38) for Airline A.
* On July 8 (July 12), the ratio of disrupted passenger delay to operated flight
delay was 84.94 (47.09) for Airline B and 41.16 (12.46) for Airline A.
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Further, the discrepancy between average delay of disrupted passengers and non-
disrupted passengers was also much higher for Airline B than for Airline A:
On July 8 (July 12), 2006, for Airline A, the disrupted passengers experienced 35.8
(11.6) times more average delay than the non-disrupted passengers. For Airline
B, the disrupted passengers experienced 81.4 (40.6) times more average delay
than the non-disrupted passengers.
These observations indicate that the relationship between flight delay and passenger
delay might be carrier-specific. In particular, we believe the cause of the above
differences is the longer average time for Airline B's disrupted passengers as they wait
for the next available itinerary to their destinations, relative to that of Airline A's
disrupted passengers. We define scheduled waiting time until the next available
itinerary with seat availability and commencing at the airport where the disrupted
passenger is located and arriving the earliest to the passenger's desired destination as
the difference between the disruption time of the passenger and the scheduled
departure time of that itinerary. Similarly, we define actual waiting time until that
itinerary as the difference between the disruption time of the passenger and the actual
departure time of that itinerary. Scheduled waiting time and actual waiting time
reported in Table 5-5 are averaged over all disrupted passengers on that day. We
discover the following:
1. Table 5-5 shows that compared to Airline A, Airline B had greater average
scheduled waiting time and average actual waiting time, on July 8 and July 12,
respectively 13 .
2. Table 5-6 shows that the average number of recovery alternatives for each Airline
A disrupted passenger is 1.3 times as much as that for each Airline B disrupted
13 The calculation of average waiting time only considers alternative itineraries within the same airlines
and excludes waiting time for the availability of alternative itineraries from other airlines.
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passenger on July 8, and 1.2 times on July 12. The average scheduled and actual
waiting time for each Airline B disrupted passenger is 2.92 (2.66) times as much
as that for each Airline A disrupted passenger on July 8 and 1.59 (1.15) times as
much on July 12.
Airline A Airline A Airline B Airline B
(07/08/2006) (07/12/2006) (07/08/2006) (07/12/2006)
Scheduled waiting(inScheduled  98.81 164.36 288.33 261.59(in minutes) I I
Actual waitingActua  110.38 238.28 293.17 274.80(in minutes)
Table 5-5: The average waiting time (scheduled and actual) per passenger until the next
available itinerary
Number of recovery Scheduled Actual
alternatives (A to B) waiting (B to A) waiting (B to A)
07/08/2006 1.3 2.92 2.66
07/12/2006 1.2 1.59 1.15
Table 5-6: The ratios per passenger of the number of recovery alternatives, scheduled waiting
time, and actual waiting time of Airline A to those of Airline B, respectively
A further comparison of the degree to which passengers are disrupted is shown in
Table 5-7. Chapter 4.4.3 discusses the situations where disrupted passengers are
assumed to be re-accommodated on the airline's own flights on the same day, on the
next-day's flights, or on other airlines' flights. We observe that, on both July 8 and July
12, Airline B had a lower percentage of disrupted passengers recovered within its own
system on the same day than did Airline A. As a result, disrupted passengers of Airline
A experienced a lower average delay than those of Airline B.
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Airline A Airline B Airline A Airline B
(07/08/2006) (07/08/2006) (07/12/2006) (07/12/2006)
Average delays of disrupted passengers (minutes) 261.76 409.39 482.99 578.25
*Percentage of disrupted passengers recovered by the airline on 45.87% 36.62% 36.08% 29.45%
the same day
Average delays of disrupted passengers recovered by the airline 149.77 218.55 240.75 290
on the same day (minutes)
*Percentage of disrupted passengers recovered by other airlines 44.50% 41.07% 39.54% 34.64%
Average delays of disrupted passengers recovered by other 265.36 356.08 446.9 503.46
airlines (minutes)
*Percentage of disrupted passengers experiencing overnight 7.80% 20.61% 24.38% 35.91%
delays
Average delays of disrupted passengers experiencing overnight 900 888 900 886.8
delays (minutes)
*Percentage of disrupted passengers who were rebooked to 1.83% 1.69% 0.21% 0. 85%
earlier flights
*Percentage of diverted passengers 0 0.21% 1.60% 0.21%
Table 5-7: Degrees of passenger disruptions (* out of all disrupted passengers)
The above facts and their corresponding outcome (that Airline B had a much higher
ratio of disrupted passenger delay to operated flight delay than did Airline A) are
rooted in the difference in the level of connecting service at Airline A's major airports
and at Airline B's major airports. Because Airline A concentrates flight operations at its
three major hubs more than Airline B does at its major airports (which spreads its flight
operations among many airports), when a disruption occurs, Airline A has more
alternative flights to re-accommodate the disrupted passengers. To summarize, fewer
recovery alternatives provided by Airline B itself, together with the longer average
waiting time for an alternative itinerary made the average disrupted passenger delay
higher for Airline B than Airline A. We conclude that, the multiplier which equalizes
flight delay and passenger delay are airline dependent. Further, the difference in the
values of this multiplier between Airline A and Airline B indicates that flight-specific
on-time performance metrics that ignore airline heterogeneity might be an inaccurate
measure of passenger experiences. Based on our results, a better on-time performance
metric should: (1) take into account carrier-specific characteristics; and (2) reflect
passenger delay.
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Highlight Finding 3 - The Impact of Traffic Levels
Due to a weaker economy and soaring fuel costs, some airlines recently announced
capacity cuts. For example, in June 2008, American Airlines said it plans to shed
capacity by as much as 12% in the fourth quarter of this year. Chicago, Dallas, and
LaGuardia will feel the biggest effects after American's action (The New York Times,
June 26, 2008). Similarly, Frontier Airlines has cut its mainline capacity by 17% from
September through March in 2008 (Yahoo Finance, June 25, 2008). Rather than reducing
capacity, Northwest Airlines has responded to the situation by cancelling two routes to
Europe and suspending another in October 2008. The routes being canceled are Detroit-
Dusseldorf and Hartford-Amsterdam, and the Minneapolis/St Paul-Paris service will be
suspended through March (Market Watch, June 26, 2008). At the same time, Southwest
Airlines is adding service in high-demand markets (for example, Denver) to take
advantage of other carriers' capacity cuts. With its hedging program, Southwest is able
to pay less for fuel than most of its rivals (The Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2008).
With these trends in the current airline industry, we expect significant changes in
airport traffic and airline route structures. In this thesis, we develop a methodology to
evaluate, on an on-going basis, changes in the underlying aviation market. Unlike
previous studies, the framework developed in this thesis is not restricted by the
availability of proprietary airline data and can be adopted to estimate itinerary-based
passenger demand and delays for any US airline included in the BTS database.
Underlying our study, there are two scenario representations, which pertain to various
levels of airport traffic under different weather conditions. The "low-delay" day
"mimics" a scenario with good weather and low levels of flight operations for both
airlines. As a second scenario, on the "high-delay" day, Airline A experienced a number
of flight cancellations and higher delays caused by adverse weather conditions in the
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East Coast (8% extreme weather delay and 48% NAS delay). These delays along with
increasing flight operations resulted in significant capacity reductions at affected
airports. The changes in flight and passenger delay statistics from July 8 to July 12, 2006
for each airline (Table 5-8) reflect the impact of increasing flight traffic on passenger
delays and disruptions when airport capacities are reduced by poor weather conditions
for different airlines. Based on Table 5-8, we divide the changes in average delay by the
percentage increase in flight operations and obtain the following results:
* For Airline A, an increase in flight operations of one percent corresponds to an
increase in the average operated flight delay (average delay of flights with
positive delays) of 18.9% (9.1%). For Airline B, an increase in flight operations of
one percent corresponds only to an increase in average operated flight delay
(average delay of flights with positive delays) of 10.3% (3.1%).
* For Airline A, an increase in flight operations of one percent corresponds to an
increase in overall passenger delay (average delay of passengers with positive
delays) of 20.9% (8.5%). For Airline B, an increase in flight operations of one
percent corresponds only to an increase in overall passenger delay (average
delay of passengers with positive delays) of 9.5% (4.4%).
* For Airline A, an increase in flight operations of one percent corresponds to an
increase in percentage of disrupted passengers (average disrupted passenger
delay) of 22.2% (3.1%). For Airline B, an increase in flight operations of one
percent corresponds only to an increase in percentage of disrupted passengers
(average disrupted passenger delay) of 12.3% (2.7%).
The above statistics suggest that under poor weather conditions, increasing flight
operations at busy airports, compared to non-congested airports, can cause a much
greater increase in passenger delay and disruptions when airport capacity is reduced by
adverse weather condition. This impact is most pronounced with the numbers of
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disrupted passengers. In our case, Airline A suffered almost twice as much increase in
the number of passenger disruptions as Airline B.
Table 5-8: Changes (%) in passenger and flight delay statistics from July 8 to July 12 in 2006
14 The legacy carrier had zero flight cancellations on July 8, 2006 and 1.52% of its flights cancelled on July
12.
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Highlight Finding 4 - The Impact of Independent Delay on Passenger Delay
Figure 5-12 and Figure 5-13 depict the cumulative distributions of passengers with
delays greater than or equal to a certain value. Figure 5-14 and Figure 5-15 depict the
cumulative distributions of disrupted passengers with delays greater than or equal to a
certain value. Note that the horizontal gap between the solid curve (July 8, 2006) and
the dashed curve (July 12, 2006) represents the difference in delays for a fixed
percentage of passengers. The vertical gap between the solid curve and the dashed
curve represents the difference in the percentage of passengers for a fixed delay. As
seen from these plots, Airline A has much greater horizontal and vertical gaps than
does Airline B. Once again, this shows on July 12, 2006, a "high-delay" day for both
airlines in terms of flight operations, Airline A suffered more passenger delay than
Airline B. This outcome is not because Airline A does not plan enough turn time slack
(in fact, the opposite is evidenced by its lower percentage of flights with propagated
delay despite that it had longer average delay per flight). Rather, it is attributable to the
higher values of independent delay, most of which are due to weather and air traffic
control (ATC). Hence, the only thing Airline A can do to improve on-time performance
is to increase its block time. However, for the magnitude of independent delay it can
experience on high-delay days, increasing block time would be prohibitively expensive
and cause unacceptably long scheduled travel times for passenger.
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Figure 5-12: Cumulative distributions of passenger delays
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Figure 5-13: Cumulative distributions of passenger delays
(among all passengers)
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5.5 Passenger Disruption Analysis
Recognizing the significance of disrupted passengers in understanding passenger
delays and schedule performance, we further investigate the characteristics that
influence the degree of disruption, such as time-of-day, as well as departing and
connecting airports. Table 5-9 lists the percentages of disrupted passengers caused by
flight cancellations and missed connections, respectively.
Airline A Airline B Airline A Airline B
(07/08/2006) (07/08/2006) (07/12/2006) (07/12/2006)
Percentage of disrupted 0.40% 0.44% 2.80% 1.25%
passengers
Percentage of passengers on
cancelled flights 0.09% 1.03% 0.91%cancelled flights
Percentage of passengers 0.40% 0.35% 1.77% 0.34%
missing connections
Table 5-9: Disrupted passengers due to flight cancellations and missed connections
From Table 5-9, the following observations are made:
* On July 8, 2006, the majority of disrupted passengers were due to missed
connections as both airlines had very low cancellation rates (in the case of Airline
A, the cancellation rate was 0). The percentage of disrupted passengers due to
missed connections for Airline B was slightly lower than that for Airline A.
* On July 12, 2006, for Airline A, 36.79% of disrupted passengers were due to
cancellations and 63.21% due to missed connections.
* On July 12, 2006, for Airline B, 72.80% of disrupted passengers were due to
cancellations and 27.20% due to missed connections.
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Explanations of the Above Observations
Notice on both days, missed connections caused the majority of passenger disruptions
for Airline A (100% on July 8, 2006 and 63.21% on July 12, 2006). In addition, on July 12,
the percentage of disrupted passengers due to missed connections for Airline A was
5.21 times greater than that for Airline B. Our estimates show that the overall passenger
mix of Airline A (Airline B) is 35% (48%) connecting passenger traffic and 65% (52%)
local passenger traffic. Moreover, the average passenger connecting time for Airline A's
passengers was 97.87 (99.41) minutes compared to 134.65 (135.29) minutes for Airline B
on July 8 (July 12), 2006. Hence, the greater percentage of passengers who misconnected
on Airline A compared to Airline B can be explained by longer delays per flight and
shorter connecting times.
Time of Disruptions
The time at which disruptions occur has an important impact on passenger delay. Past
studies have shown that passenger delay can be more affected by the time of disruption
than route frequency (Bratu and Barnhart (2005) [3]). Late disruptions leave limited
options to re-accommodate the resulting group of disrupted passengers. Therefore,
passengers with disruptions later in the day tend to experience greater delays than
those with earlier disruptions. In Figure 5-16, we depict the total number of disruptions
occurring in each two-hour window for both airlines on July 8 and July 12. We observe:
The majority of Airline A's disruptions happened during the later part of both
days. Moreover, Airline A had a significant percentage of passengers connecting
during the later part of the day at its major hubs. As shown in Figures 5-2 and 5-
3, the highest percentage of connecting passenger traffic happened from 9:00pm
to 9:59pm at both Hub 1 (81% of passengers are connecting) and Hub 2 (73% of
passengers are connecting). The late-in-the-day cancellations and delays left
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limited time for Airline A to re-accommodate the disrupted passengers who
missed their connections or encountered a cancelled flight.
On July 8, 2006, Airline B had the highest number of disruptions between 8am
and 10am, with flights cancelled during those two hours. In contrast, on July 12,
most of Airline B's passenger disruptions occurred during the later part of the
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Figure 5-16: Number of disrupted passengers in each two-hour time window
(Left: Airline A, Right: Airline B)
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5.6 Disruption Analysis by Airport
5.6.1 Aggregating Disruptions by Airport
Aggregating disrupted passengers by airport provides useful information on the
number of disrupted passengers at different airports within the airline's system. Figure
5-17 to Figure 5-22 give the percentages of disrupted passengers at different airports.
Airline A (Airline B) has a total of 12 (30) airports contributing passenger disruptions
and we index these airports from 1 to 12 (1 to 30). For Airline A, hub airports are 1, 2,
and 3. For Airline B, "hub" airports are 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9. For both airlines, the major
airports had a large number of disrupted passengers. This makes sense because these
airports have higher passenger shares compared to the secondary airports. However,
we observe that Airline A's hubs experienced passenger disruptions to a greater extent
percentage-wise than did Airline B's major airports. In contrast to Airline A, Airline B's
disruptions are spread out among many more airports. We also observe that for Airline
A, the three hubs had the highest percentages of disrupted passengers on both days. For
Airline B, however, some secondary airports had higher percentages of disrupted
passengers than did the major airports. This indicates that passenger disruptions are




Figure 5-17: Percent of disrupted passengers at different airports on July 8
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Figure 5-18: Percent of disrupted passengers at different airports on July 12
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Figure 5-19: Percent of disrupted passengers due to cancelled flights at different airports
of Airline B on July 815
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Figure 5-20: Percent of disrupted passengers due to missed connections at different
airports of Airline B on July 8
15 Airline A had no flights cancelled on July 8, 2006. Hence, the number of disrupted passengers due to
cancelled flights was zero and the number of disrupted passengers due to missed connections was the
same as Figure 5-17.
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Figure 5-21: Percent of disrupted passengers due to cancelled flights at different airports
on July 12
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Figure 5-22: Percent of disrupted passengers due to missed connections at different
airports on July 12
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5.6.2 Percentage of Disruptions by Airport
In the following analysis, we compute: (1) the percentage of all disrupted passengers;
(2) the percentage of disrupted passengers due to flight cancellations; and (3) the
percentage of disrupted passengers due to missed connections, attributed to the
different airports of each airline on July 8 and July 12, respectively (shown in Figure 5-
23 to Figure 5-28). For passengers with missed connections, the airport that causes the
disruption is not necessarily the same as the disruption location. For example, consider
Passenger p on a 2-leg itinerary A-B-C, whose first leg f (A-B) departs 1 hour after the
scheduled departure time. The total delay experienced by f (A-B) is 1 hour and 10
minutes, where the additional 10 minutes may be due to a wait-to-land at Airport B
and/or longer flying time than scheduled. In this case, Passenger p misses his/her
connection and is disrupted at Airport B mainly due to the departure delay at Airport
A. We therefore claim that the disruption is mainly attributable to Airport A. If f (A-B)
departs only 10 minutes after the scheduled time, however, but must wait for an hour
after it is ready to land at Airport B, we say the disruption is mainly attributable to
Airport B. Therefore, when a disruption is due to a missed connection, the following
rule is adopted to decide the percentage of the disruption attributed to its
corresponding late departure and late arrival, respectively:
First, we compute the total delay (TD) of f(A-B) at Airport B, which is defined as
TD (f (A-B)) = AAT (f (A-B)) - PAT (f (A-B)),
where AAT represents the actual arrival time and PAT the planned arrival time.
Second, we compute the total departure delay (TDD) off (A-B) at Airport A, which is
TDD (f (A-B)) = ADT (f (A-B)) - PDT (f (A-B)),
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where ADT represents the actual departure time and PDT the planned departure time.
Last, we compute the percentage of delay at Airport B explained by the departure delay
at Airport A as:
Percentage of D (f (A-B)) at Airport A = Max (100%, TDD (f (A-B)) / TD (f (A-B))) 16,
which is also the percentage of the disruption attributed to Airport A when a passenger
misses his/her connection at Airport B. Hence, we compute the percentage of delay at
Airport B caused by delay at Airport B as
Percentage of D (f (A-B)) at Airport B = 1- Percentage of D (f (A-B)) at Airport A,
which is also the percentage of the disruption attributed to Airport B when a passenger
misses his/her connection at Airport B. If Percentage of D (f (A-B)) by Airport A is 60%
of the total delay, we say 60% of the disruption is attributed to Airport A.
With such a rule, we observe the following:
* For Airline A, the majority of overall passenger disruptions resulted from Hub 2
and Hub 1. On July 8, 2006, these two airports caused all disruptions of Airline
A. In particular, Hub 2 caused 25% of the disruptions and Hub 1 caused 75% of
the disruptions. Furthermore, all disruptions on July 8 were due to missed
connections. On July 12, 94.8% of disruptions resulted from these two airports. In
particular, Hub 2 caused 58% of the disruptions and Hub 1 caused 36.8% of the
disruptions. The third hub of Airline A, contributed only 3.4% of the disruptions
and a non-hub airport contributed 0.7%. Furthermore, of disruptions due to
flight cancellations, Hub 2 caused 89.5%, the non-hub airport 2.3%, and Hub 3
16 It is possible for TDD to be greater than TD.
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6.3%. Of disruptions due to missed connections, Hub 2 caused 43.51%, Hub 1
53.29%, and Hub 3 0.36%17.
* These results for Airline A make sense because both Hub 1 and Hub 2 are very
busy airports, with weather often impacting flight operations. Because the
percentage of connecting passengers at Hub 1 for Airline A is much higher than
at Hub 2 (Figures 5-2 and 5-3), Hub 1 has the majority of disruptions due to
missed connections.
* In contrast to Airline A, Airline B's disruptions are spread out more evenly
among airports. Another striking difference is that the major airports of Airline B
did not contribute to the majority of passenger disruptions. This perhaps has to
do with the fact that passenger traffic is distributed more evenly in Airline B's
system, unlike Airline A's, where a much larger portion of passengers connect
through its major hubs (c.f. Section 5.2), and the longer passenger connecting
times in Airline B's operation. In addition, the relationship between the number
of disruptions and a particular airport may be strengthened in a system like
Airline A whose hubs tend to locate in very busy airports which are highly
impacted by capacity reductions due to weather.





































Figure 5-26: The percentage of disrupted passengers due to cancelled flights contributed by
different airports
18 Airline A had no flights cancelled on July 8, 2006 and the number of disrupted passengers due to






Figure 5-27: The percentage of disrupted passengers due to missed connections
contributed by different airports1 9
Airline A (07/12/2006)
0.36% Hub 3
0.36% 1 - 2.05%
Airline B (07/12/2006)
Figure 5-28: The percentage of disrupted passengers due to missed connections contributed by
different airports
19 Airline A had no flights cancelled on July 8, 2006. Hence, the number of disrupted passengers due to
cancelled flights was zero and the number of disrupted passengers due to missed connections was the
same as Figure 5-23 (left).
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Summary of the Findings
Airline A has passenger operations concentrated in its three hubs, two of which are in
the eastern US. As stated in Chapter 3.2.2, out of the fourteen flight cancellations, half of
them were due to weather problems at airports located in the east. All cancellations of
Airline B, however, arose from carrier problems rather than weather. A network carrier
like A that concentrates its passenger operations at very busy airports can be at a
disadvantage when weather adversely affects the hubs. Carriers like Airline B, in
contrast, distribute passenger traffic more evenly in the system and thus are less
impacted when some of the major airports suffer severe delays. Furthermore, as our
analysis in Chapter 3.2.2 shows, Airline A suffered almost three times more NAS delay
than Airline B (Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2). On July 12, NAS delay accounted for nearly
half of the total delay in Airline A's system while only 17% in Airline B's system. The
difference in NAS delay is attributable to the fact that Airline A has a significant
percentage of flights flying into or out of very busy hubs subjected to weather
conditions and ground delay programs (GDP)20 . This difference further explains why
the major hubs of Airline A experienced a much higher number of passenger
disruptions on the "high-delay" day than those of Airline B.
20 The percentage of airports with GDPs is 39% for Airline A and 27% for Airline B. One of the major hubs
of Airline A had the highest number of issued GDP's between 2007 and 2008 among all airports with
ground holds, approximately 190. This implies a GDP was issued basically every other day at this airport





This thesis aims to develop a framework for analyzing airlines' operational
performances under different strategic decisions. A detailed study is conducted to
compare differences between a major U.S. legacy carrier ("Airline A") and a major U.S.
low-cost carrier ("Airline B") on two different days, a "low-delay" day and a "high-
delay" day. We evaluate the impact of scheduling practices, network structures,
passenger mix, and load factors on flight-based delays and on-time performances, and
passenger delays and disruptions. The major components of this thesis consist of:
* Investigating the differences in the placement of slack time and other scheduling
practices among the two types of airlines, and providing the rationale behind
and effectiveness of these different strategies;
* Examining the sources of aircraft delays for the different airline types and
identifying airport contributions to the delays experienced by these airlines;
* Developing a methodology to quantify passenger delays using publicly
accessible data; and
* Comparing flight delays, passenger delays, and passenger disruptions between
the two airlines with their different network structures and scheduling practices.
We conclude that differences in scheduling practices, network structure, and passenger
mix result in differences in aircraft delays, and levels of passenger delays and
disruptions. Hence, carrier-specific characteristics influence carrier performance and
should be considered when designing on-time performance metrics. Characteristics that
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particularly affect the hub-and-spoke legacy carrier A are: (1) its hubs that experience
heavy traffic volume, and are often subject to ground delay programs (GDPs) caused by
poor weather conditions; and (2) its banked operations at two hubs, with a set of
arriving flight legs scheduled closely with a set of departing flight legs to allow
passenger connections between arriving and departing flight legs. Characteristics that
particularly affect the low-cost carrier B are: (1) its flight network and passenger traffic
is distributed more evenly across airports in the network; (2) it operates at a set of
airports that are overall less congested than those of the major airports of legacy carrier
A; and (3) its de-peaked (de-banked) flight schedule that provides longer passenger
connection times on average, thereby reducing the chance of missed passenger
connections.
In Chapter 2, we compare the scheduling practices of Airline A and Airline B and
evaluate the resulting impact on flight on-time performance. This analysis is important
because the way airlines buffer their schedules has a significant effect on flight on-time
performance and passenger delays. We observe:
1. The legacy carrier A tends to plan more slack in its ground turn time while the
low-cost carrier B tends to plan more slack in its block time. Furthermore, carrier
B schedules almost identical amounts of turn time at each airport.
2. The differences between actual and planned turn times at different airports were
more homogenous and smaller for the "high-delay" day for B, relative to those
for carrier A.
3. The two airlines do not share many common arcs in their network operations.
This implies carrier A and carrier B operate at different airports. Carrier A's
major operations are at busier airports.
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We believe the differences in schedule padding between the two airlines have to do
with that Airline A operates banked hubs in which ground turn times, by necessity,
must be longer on average to accommodate connecting passengers.
Airline B, however, operates de-banked hubs and schedules more rapid turns at
airports to maximize productivity of aircraft and crews. To stem delay propagation and
improve on-time performance, Airline B schedules, more slack in its block times.
In Chapter 3, we first compare flight delays and cancellations of the legacy carrier to
those of the low-cost carrier. We observe:
1. On the "high-delay" day, extreme weather problems contributed 8% of the total
delay to the legacy carrier's system while only 4% to the low-cost carrier's
system.
2. The legacy carrier suffered almost three times as much NAS congestion delay
than did the low-cost carrier. On the high delay day, NAS delay accounted for
nearly half of the total delay in carrier A's network.
3. On the "high-delay" day, out of the fourteen flight cancellations of the legacy
carrier, half of them were due to weather problems at four East Coast airports.
All cancellations of the low-cost carrier, however, resulted from carrier problems
rather than weather.
Additionally, we find that the overall 15-OTP performance of each airline is the sum
over all airports of the average airport-specific 15-OTP weighted by the percentages of
the airline's flights at that airport. This suggests that the extent of an airline's delays are
impacted significantly by the airports at which they operate, independent of their
scheduling practices, NAS delays being a distinguishing factor. NAS delays impact
more significantly congested airports, and hence, NAS delays have more of an impact
on Airline A than Airline B.
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We decompose flight delays into "propagated delay" caused by late incoming flights
and "independent delay" caused by issues attributable to airport congestion, carrier
operations, NAS congestion, security, and/or extreme weather. We observe that:
1. The average IDD and IAD of the legacy carrier are significantly greater than
those of the low-cost carrier on July 12, 2006, the "high-delay" day. Moreover,
IDD plus IAD are together more than triple the propagated delay for the legacy
carrier on that day. For the low-cost carrier, IDD plus IAD is almost double that
of PD. The legacy carrier experienced twice as much average PD as the low-cost
carrier on July 12; however, the percentages of flights experiencing delay
propagation were higher for the low-cost carrier than for the legacy carrier on
both days and the legacy carrier achieved a slightly lower average PD per flight
(90% of the low-cost carrier's PD).
2. On July 8, 7 (4) airports accounted for 100% (80%) of the PD in the legacy
carrier's network while 57 (23) airports did in the low-cost carrier's network. On
July 12, 37 (12) airports accounted for 100% (80%) of the PD in the legacy carrier's
network compared to 60 (27) airports in the low-cost carrier's network. We
believe the fact that the low-cost carrier has delay propagation spread among
many more airports than the legacy carrier is due to the low-cost carrier's
scheduling practice of limiting turn time slack.
3. For both airlines, the majority of IDD, IAD, and PD were contributed by their
major airports. However, when the aggregated delay statistics for July 12 are
normalized by the number of flight operations at each airport, the magnitudes of
independent delay were much less at the major airports of the low-cost carrier
than at those of the legacy carrier. Specifically, the legacy carrier experienced 2.64
(2.99) times more average IDD (IAD) per flight at its three major hubs than did
the low-cost carrier.
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4. Both independent delay and propagated delay at two of the hubs of the legacy
carrier were significantly greater on July 12, 2006, the "high-delay" day, than on
July 8, 2006, the "low-delay" day. Between the "high-delay" day and "low-
delay" day, the percent changes in independent delay and propagated delay of
the low-cost carrier's major airports were much less compared to those of the
legacy carrier.
We believe these differences are largely attributable to the fact that the legacy carrier
has a higher percentage of flights connecting at congested airports that are often subject
to weather conditions that reduce airport capacity. Most of the low-cost carrier's major
airports are not as congested and not as impacted by reductions in capacity due to
weather. When delays occur at the legacy carrier's airports, delay that propagates is
likely to be larger than that of the low-cost carrier. However, more flights experience
delay propagation for the low-cost carrier because there is little turn time slack in its
operation and an arrival delay is likely to propagate to the next flight, unlike the legacy
carrier, which has relatively more turn time slack. Further, on July 12, 2006, NAS delay
accounted for almost half of total delay in the legacy carrier's system while it
represented only 17% in the low-cost carrier's system.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on passenger delay. In Chapter 4, we develop a 3-stage approach
to estimate passenger demand and quantify passenger delay using only publicly
available data. Our approach includes: (1) a search algorithm that generates itineraries;
(2) a linear integer programming formulation that allocates passengers to the generated
itineraries; and (3) a Passenger Delay Calculator (PDC) that computes passenger delay
statistics. The major contribution of our methodology is that it provides a way to
estimate passenger booking information for all scheduled flights using data from BTS.
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In Chapter 5, we compare passenger delays and disruptions for the legacy carrier and
the low-cost carrier. This chapter explores relationships between passenger delays and
flight leg delays, cancellation rates, load factors, network structures, passenger mix, and
schedule design. Our findings are as follows:
Like the legacy carrier, the low-cost carrier exhibits a "hub" operation at its major
airports. However, there is a difference in the level of connecting passenger
traffic at the legacy carrier's major airports and at the low-cost carrier's major
airports. Connecting passengers are distributed more evenly in the low-cost
carrier's system and hence, the share of connecting passengers at the low-cost
carrier's major airports is not as significant as that of the legacy carrier. Strictly
speaking, "point-to-point" service is an inaccurate description of our low-cost
carrier's network operations. Rather, the low cost carrier provides "hub-and-
spoke" network service but with more "hubs" serving various levels of
connecting passenger traffic in the network. The overall passenger mix of the
legacy carrier (the low-cost carrier) is 35% (48%) connecting passenger traffic and
65% (52%) non-connecting passenger traffic.
Of the three major hubs of the legacy carrier, two of them are banked hubs, while the
low-cost carrier has de-peaked schedules at its major airports. This explains why the
low-cost carrier schedules shorter aircraft turns on average. By adding more slack into
block time, the low-cost carrier is able to increase on-time arrival performance. The
legacy carrier, however, schedules more slack in ground turn times so that flights can
"catch" a bank at the hubs.
In terms of passenger delays, our results confirm findings from previous research that
flight delays can severely underestimate delays of passengers who encountered
cancelled flights or missed connections (namely, disrupted passengers). Several key
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differences between the two airlines in terms of passenger delay statistics are
highlighted in the following:
1. We find that on July 12, 2006, the low-cost carrier had a higher percentage of
flights with propagated delay than the legacy carrier but experienced much less
passenger delay. The low-cost carrier can schedule its turn time with less slack
and let delay propagate and still disrupt fewer passengers than the legacy carrier
because the low-cost carrier offers longer connection times for its passengers
than does the legacy carrier. As our analysis shows, the average passenger
connecting time for the legacy carrier's passengers was 97.87 (99.41) minutes
compared to 134.65 (135.29) minutes for the low-cost carrier on July 8 (July 12),
2006.
2. The ratios of passenger delay to operated flight delay for the low-cost carrier B
were higher than the corresponding values for the legacy carrier A (Table 6-1).
This difference is most pronounced in terms of the ratio of disrupted passenger
delay to operated flight delay even though on the "high-delay" day, the
percentage of disrupted passengers was much higher for carrier A than for the
carrier B. Also on July 8 (July 12), 2006, for carrier A, the disrupted passengers
experienced 35.8 (11.6) times more average delay than the non-disrupted
passengers. For carrier B, the disrupted passengers experienced 81.4 (40.6) times
more average delay than the non-disrupted passengers.
Carrier A Carrier B Carrier A Carrier B
(07/08/2006) (07/08/2006) (07/12/2006) (07/12/2006)
Average delay of all passengers to average 1.28 1.81 1.38 1.73
delay of operated flights
Average delay of disrupted passengers to 41.16 84.94 12.46 47.09
average delay of operated flights _ I
Table 6-1: Ratios of Passenger Delay to Flight Delay
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The second observation indicates that the relationship between flight delay and
passenger delay is far from being linear, but rather, a complex function of many airline-
specific factors. The fact that the low-cost carrier had a much higher ratio of disrupted
passenger delay to operated flight delay than did the legacy carrier is because:
Unlike the legacy carrier (which concentrates flight operations at its three major
hubs), the low-cost carrier spreads its flight operations among many airports.
Therefore, when a disruption occurs, the low-cost carrier has fewer alternative
flights to re-accommodate disrupted passengers than does the legacy carrier.
Having fewer recovery alternatives provided by the low-cost carrier itself results in
longer average waiting times for an alternative itinerary and consequently longer
delays for the low-cost carrier's disrupted passengers than for the legacy carrier's. From
these facts, we conclude that the multiplier which equalizes flight delay and passenger
delay are airline dependent. Further, the difference in the values of this multiplier
between the legacy carrier and the low-cost carrier indicates that flight-specific on-time
performance metrics that ignore airline heterogeneity can be an inaccurate measure of
passenger experiences.
We find that under poor weather conditions, increasing flight operations at busy
airports, compared to non-congested airports, can result in much greater increases in
passenger delay and disruption. This phenomenon is most pronounced with the
numbers of disrupted passengers. Supporting statistics are summarized in the
following:
For the legacy carrier, an increase in flight operations of one percent corresponds
to an increase in the average operated flight delay (average delay of flights with
positive delays) of 18.9% (9.1%). For the low-cost carrier, an increase in flight
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operations of one percent corresponds only to an increase in average operated
flight delay (average delay of flights with positive delays) of 10.3% (3.1%).
* For the legacy carrier, an increase in flight operations of one percent corresponds
to an increase in overall passenger delay (average delay of passengers with
positive delays) of 20.9% (8.5%). For the low-cost carrier, an increase in flight
operations of one percent corresponds only to an increase in overall passenger
delay (average delay of passengers with positive delays) of 9.5% (4.4%).
* For the legacy carrier, an increase in flight operations of one percent corresponds
to an increase in the percentage of disrupted passengers (average disrupted
passenger delay) of 22.2% (3.1%). For the low-cost carrier, an increase in flight
operations of one percent corresponds only to an increase in the percentage of
disrupted passengers (average disrupted passenger delay) of 12.3% (2.7%).
The fact that the legacy carrier suffered more passenger delay than the low-cost carrier
on the high-delay day is not because the legacy carrier does not plan enough turn time
slack (in fact, the opposite is evidenced by its lower percentage of flights with
propagated delay despite that it had longer average delay per flight). Rather, it is
attributable to the higher values of independent delay, most of which are due to
weather and air traffic control (ATC). Hence, the only thing the legacy carrier can do to
improve on-time performance is to increase its block time. However, for the magnitude
of independent delay it experiences, commensurate increases in block time would be
prohibitively expensive and cause unacceptably long scheduled travel times for
passenger. This suggests that airlines at congested airports subjected to weather and
ATC delays cannot adequately adjust their planned schedules to avoid excessive delays
at all times.
In terms of passenger disruption causes, we find that missed connections contributed
the majority of passenger disruptions for the legacy carrier (100% on July 8, 2006 and
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63.21% on July 12, 2006). In addition, on July 12, the percentage of disrupted passengers
due to missed connections for the legacy carrier was 5.21 times greater than that for the
low-cost carrier. The greater percentage of legacy carrier passengers who misconnected
compared to the low-cost carrier can be explained by longer delays per flight, shorter
connecting times, and larger percentages of passengers connecting.
For the legacy carrier, the majority of passenger disruptions occurred at its major hubs,
while disruptions of the low-cost carrier were spread out more evenly among airports.
Another striking difference is that the major airports of the low-cost carrier did not
contribute the majority of disruptions. This perhaps has to do with the fact that
passenger traffic is distributed more evenly in the low-cost carrier's system, in contrast
to the legacy carrier, where a much larger portion of passengers connect through its
major hubs. In addition, the relationship between the number of disruptions and a
particular airport may be strengthened in a system like the legacy carrier whose hubs
tend to locate in airports with high levels of congestion and frequent GDPs caused by
poor weather conditions.
6.2 Future Directions
This thesis evaluates two major U.S. airlines on two different days to reveal the
differences in scheduling practices, aircraft delays, and passenger delays and
disruptions. In future work, more airlines and more days of operation should be
studied to gain more insights into the passenger delays in the entire National Air
Transportation System (NATS). Additionally, actual passenger enplanements from
proprietary airline passenger data should be used to validate our findings.
Another limitation of this study is that in our PDC, we allow passengers to be rebooked
on other airlines using a "rule-of-thumb" estimation in which schedules and passenger
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booking information for the other airlines is unknown. Therefore, an inaccurate
estimate of disrupted passenger delays may occur in our approximation. Future work
should consider explicitly itineraries of other airlines.
Future research should consider scenarios of various load factors and airline network
structures and sensitivity analyses should be conducted. In Figure 6-1, we provide the
scheme for future scenario and experiment development and sensitivity analyses.
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IDD, IAD, and PD statistics based
on various scenarios




Passenger and flight delay statistics based
on various scenarios
Airline Scale (A System Component)
Sensitivity Analysis
Scenario 1 - Various
Air Traffic Levels 7
Exp 1 Exp2 Exp3
Scenario 2 - Various
Network Structures
Exp 4 Exp 5
Scenario 3 - Various
Load Factor Levels
Exp 6
Exp 6 Exp 7 Exp 8
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